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THE BEST WAY OUT IS ALWAYS THROUGH:† CHANGING THE EMPLOYMENT ATWILL DEFAULT TO PROTECT PERSONAL AUTONOMY
Matthew T. Bodie*
Abstract
Employment at-will is the default rule of termination for the vast majority of American
employment relationships. The rule creates a presumption—a strong one—that the contract for
employment allows either party to terminate the contract at any point in time. Since its inception,
this bright line rule has given way to carefully curated exceptions, primarily to protect against
discrimination and retaliation. This Article proposes that state courts create a new exception to the
at-will rule—or, perhaps more accurately, acknowledge an intricacy within the existing default. The
personal-autonomy presumption would modify at-will to make clear that employers will not take any
action against an employee based on the employee’s personal autonomy, so long as that autonomy
does not interfere with the employer’s business or reputation. Employee personal autonomy would be
defined to include political affiliations, religious observance, and recreational activities. The default
rule would hold that, as part of the bargain between employer and employee, the employer agrees not
to leverage the power that it exercises in the work realm to influence employees improperly in the
personal realm. In order to change the default autonomy rule, employers would need to further
develop their expectations as to off-duty conduct and communicate those expectations to employees.
As a result, the employment contract would provide both employers and employees with a better
understanding of performance requirements and of the boundaries of their relationship.

ROBERT FROST, A Servant to Servants, in NORTH OF BOSTON 66 (1914) (“He says the best way out is
always through./And I agree to that, or in so far/As that I can see no way out but through— . . . .”).
* Callis Family Professor, Saint Louis University School of Law; Co-Reporter, Restatement of
Employment Law. This Article represents my own perspective and not those of the American Law
Institute or my fellow reporters. I am much obliged for comments from participants in the Saint
Louis University Faculty Workshop Series and the 2014 Law & Society Annual Meeting, as well as
thoughts and suggestions from ALI members and advisors on the multiple iterations of § 7.08 of the
Restatement. I am also grateful to Saint Louis University School of Law for funding through its
former Summer Research Grant program. I greatly appreciate comments and suggestions from
Miriam Cherry, Dennis Corgill, Zev Eigen, Michael Fischl, Ruben Garcia, Charlotte Garden, Jesse
Goldner, Tim Greaney, John Griesbach, Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, Marcia McCormick, Carol
Needham, Karen Sanner, Paul Secunda, and Doug Williams. In addition, I was fortunate to receive
thoughtful feedback on earlier drafts from students in Miriam Cherry’s “Virtual Work” and “People
Analytics” classes. Many thanks to Jim Dougherty and Cody Huffines for excellent research
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INTRODUCTION
The “employment at-will” doctrine serves as the presumptive default rule for
the vast majority of American employment relationships.1 Despite its hoary
provenance and established mien,2 the doctrine has been consistently attacked by
See Richard A. Bales, Explaining the Spread of at-Will Employment As an Interjurisdictional Race to the Bottom
of Employment Standards, 75 TENN. L. REV. 453, 459 (2008) (“Today, the at-will rule remains the default
employment rule in every state but Montana . . . .”). A classic formulation of the rule can be found in
Payne v. Western & Atl. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 518-19 (1884), overruled on other grounds, Hutton v.
Watters, 179 S.W. 134, 138 (Tenn. 1915) (“[M]en must be left, without interference to buy and sell
where they please, and to discharge or retain employees at will for good cause or for no cause, or even
for bad cause without thereby being guilty of an unlawful act per se. It is a right which an employe
may exercise in the same way, to the same extent, for the same cause or want of cause as the
employer.”). The Restatement of Employment Law sets forth the at-will rule as the presumptive
default. RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 2.01 (2015) (“Either party may terminate an
employment relationship with or without cause unless the right to do so is limited by statute, other
law or public policy, or an agreement between the parties, a binding employer promise, or a binding
employer policy statement.”).
2 HORACE G. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT § 134, at 272 (John D.
Parsons, Jr. ed., 1877). See Rachel Arnow-Richman, Mainstreaming Employment Contract Law: The Common
Law Case for Reasonable Notice of Termination, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1513, 1520-21 (2014) (“Since almost every
jurisdiction has judicially embraced Wood's statement of the law, it is now firmly ensconced . . . .”).
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generations of academics.3 Its critics deplore the complete and largely unreviewable
control over the employment relationship that it provides to employers. Moreover,
some have also argued that the at-will rule represents a poor reading of common-law
contract doctrine.4 Rather than merely serving as a presumption, the at-will rule has
become a much stickier default in many jurisdictions, rolling like a steamroller over
evidence of contrary intent.5 Combining questionable assumptions about the parties’
intent with arguably retrograde policy effects, the at-will rule has all the hallmarks of
a creature of Lochner-ian laissez-faire jurisprudence, except that it lives on into the
present. And yet, no American court has adopted anything to the contrary.6
The at-will rule is best understood as a compromise between courts and
employers over decisionmaking authority within the employment relationship.7
Courts have largely granted to employers unreviewable discretion over that
relationship unless outside concerns come into play. The employer is given leeway
to judge for itself whether the employee fits within the internal organization of the
firm. In return, courts intrude when employers use their power to harm third-party
interests.8 The balance between impacts outside and inside the boundaries of the
firm best explains why courts have provided the at-will presumption with such
power. However, this balance has often been lost in many explanations of the rule.
Instead of framing the at-will rule as a method of providing the employer with
control over business-related functions, it is instead framed as complete and
unreviewable discretion to fire someone “for any reason, or no reason at all.”9 This
wide-open discretion is at odds with workers’ actual understanding of the at-will rule,

E.g. Lawrence E. Blades, Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of
Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404, 1405 (1967); Matthew Finkin, et al., Working Group on Chapter
2 of the Proposed Restatement of Employment Law: Employment Contracts: Termination, 13 EMP. RTS. & EMP.
POL'Y J. 93, 100 (2009); Theodore J. St. Antoine, A Seed Germinates: Unjust Discharge Reform Heads
Toward Full Flower, 67 NEB. L. REV. 56, 65-66 (1988); Clyde W. Summers, Employment At Will in the
United States: The Divine Right of Employers, 3 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 65, 77-78 (2000).
4 Finkin et al., supra note 3, at 95-107 (arguing that the at-will rule is in greater flux than generally
appreciated).
5 See Deborah A. DeMott, Investing in Work: Wilkes As an Employment Law Case, 33 W. NEW ENG. L.
REV. 497, 509 (2011) (suggest that “the at-will rule may be a sticky default more often and for a more
complex set of reasons than heretofore believed”).
6 RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 2.01 cmt. b (2015) (“The high courts in 49 states and the
District of Columbia recognize as the default rule the principle that employment is presumptively an
at-will relationship. (The sole exception is Montana, which by statute requires ‘good cause’ . . . .)”).
7 Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, The Enforceability of Norms and the Employment Relationship, 144
U. PA. L. REV. 1913, 1938 (1996) (arguing that even though most employment relationships have a
norm of only for-cause termination, this norm should not be enforced by courts).
8 See RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 5.01 (2015) (setting forth the tort of wrongful discharge
in violation of public policy).
9 See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Salsbury Chem., Inc., 613 N.W.2d 275, 280 (Iowa 2000).
3
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in which employees actually expect that employers are limited to something much
closer to just cause.10
In order to restore the balance inherent in the at-will compromise, courts
should refine that doctrine by adding another default presumption: that the employer
will not make employee-related decisions based on employee actions or beliefs that
lie outside of the employment relationship.11 This addendum reflects simply the
other side of the at-will coin: complete employer discretion over on-the-job
decisions, but no employer discretion over decisions that are not related to
employment. Such a reform would make the rule not only a more balanced
compromise between the needs of employer and employee, but it would also better
reflect the general understanding of the employment relationship. No employee
goes into the employment relationship expecting that the employer will use that
relationship to pressure the employee into changing her personal life. A carve-out
for employee decisions, beliefs, and activities that take place outside the workplace—
which I label as “personal autonomy”—puts the at-will rule on more solid footing,
both doctrinally and empirically.
Protecting personal autonomy would also provide a principled approach to
regulating employer discretion within the workplace. Many of the statutory or
common-law doctrines that modify or limit the at-will rule are related to concerns
about employee autonomy.12 And yet specific autonomy protections remain
relegated to the public sector (through the First Amendment)13 or to state statutory
schemes (such as off-duty laws).14 A common-law recognition for an autonomy
carve-out would be in keeping with the role of courts in creating and maintaining the
at-will doctrine. And it would provide a principled defense for the at-will rule
itself—a defense that currently rests on weak doctrinal and theoretical foundations.
This Article presents the argument for an autonomy addendum to
employment at-will. Part I discusses the at-will rule, its role in the employment
relationship, and its stickiness as a default. Part II discusses the concept of employee
personal autonomy, and it sets forth the numerous existing common-law and
statutory protections that address autonomy concerns. Part III discusses two ways in
which the common law could protect autonomy: through a wrongful discharge tort
See Rock & Wachter, supra note 7, at 1930 (“We know that generally, even in non-union firms, the
norm governing termination is “no discharge without cause.”). In an empirical study of worker
attitudes, Pauline Kim found that 89% of respondents felt that it would be unlawful for an employer
to terminate an employee based on personal dislike. Pauline T. Kim, Bargaining with Imperfect
Information: A Study of Worker Perceptions of Legal Protection in an at-Will World, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 105,
134 (1997).
11 This new presumption is set forth in RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 7.08 (2015). This
Article represents an extended argument in support of § 7.08.
12 See Part II.B infra.
13 See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977) (noting that constitutional privacy interests include
“the interest in independence in making certain kinds of important decisions”); see also Part II.B.6 infra.
14 See Part II.B.5 infra.
10
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or through a contractual default rule. It argues that the common law should
recognize a personal-autonomy presumption within the overall at-will rule.
Although there are merits to mandatory protection through tort, a contractual
approach better matches with the at-will rule as well as the nuanced relationship
between firms and employees.
I. THE EMPLOYMENT AT-WILL DEFAULT
A. The Common-Law Doctrine of At-Will
Employees with indefinite term contracts are presumed to be working at will.
That presumption replaced the prior English rule, which assumed that employees
had been hired for a year, in order to protect seasonal agricultural workers from
being released in the cold of winter.15 The traditional story lays the blame for this
change on Horace Wood, whose treatise somberly laid out the basics: “With us the
rule is inflexible, that a general of indefinite hiring is prima facie a hiring at-will, and
if the servant seeks to make it out a yearly hiring, the burden is on him to establish it
by proof.”16 Commentators have questioned Wood’s support for his rule, implying
that he fabricated it with little precedential backing.17 Others, however, have argued
that the rule was well-established, and in turn questioned the importance of Wood’s
actual role.18 Regardless of its provenance, the rule proved extremely popular with
courts, and it is now the unquestioned default rule in forty-nine of the fifty states.19
1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 425 (Christian, 12th ed. 1793) (finding the rule in
employment to be: “[i]f the hiring be general, without any particular time limited, the law construes it
to be a hiring for a year”), cited in Feinman, supra note JF1, at 119-20.
16 WOOD, supra note 2, § 134, at 272.
17 An A.L.R. entry was the first to question Wood’s support for his rule. Annotation, Duration of
Contract of Hiring Which Specified No Term, but Fixes Compensation at a Certain Amount Per Day,
Week, Month, or Year, 11 A.L.R. 469, 475-76 (1921) (saying that the “proposition was without any
authority whatever to support it.”). See also Jay Feinman, The Development of the Employment At
Will Rule, 20 Am. J. Legal Hist. 118, 126-27 (1976) (questioning whether Wood’s Rule was based on
solid doctrinal support); Gary Minda, The Common Law of Employment At-Will in New York: The Paralysis
of Nineteenth Century Doctrine, 36 SYRACUSE L. REV. 939, 970 (1985) (“Commentators now agree that
Wood invented his own rule.”).
18 Mayer G. Freed & Daniel D. Polsby, The Doubtful Provenance of “Wood’s Rule” Revisited, 22 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 551, 558 (1990) (“Horace Wood did not make up the rule of employment at will. He just told it
like it was.”)’; Andrew P. Morriss, Exploding Myths: An Empirical and Economic Reassessment of the Rise of
Employment At-Will, 59 MO. L. REV. 679, 756 (1994) (finding support for Wood’s Rule at the time of
publication).
19 RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 2.01 cmt. b (2015) (“The high courts in 49 states and the
District of Columbia recognize as the default rule the principle that employment is presumptively an
at-will relationship. (The sole exception is Montana, which by statute requires ‘good cause’ . . . .)”).
The at-will rule has been codified in some states. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 34-7-1 (“An indefinite
hiring may be terminated at will by either party.”).
15
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The at-will rule creates a presumption that the employee can be terminated
without cause—or, as many courts have framed it, “for any reason, or no reason at
all.”20 The notion is that both employers and employees are free to walk away from
the relationship at any time. As a presumption, the at-will doctrine serves as a
default rule that applies if the parties have not specified otherwise. Employees can
receive any sort of protection under contract, if they negotiate for such. Outside of
high-level executives or employees represented by unions, however, most employees
in the United States work under an at-will regime.21
Default rules are a common way of resolving ambiguities or incomplete
terms within contracts. The common law recognizes a set of default contract
terms,22 as does the Uniform Commercial Code.23 Default rules are often necessary
to fill in gaps when the parties have failed to specify a term that is or becomes
necessary to determine whether the contract was formed or has been breached. In
choosing which default rule to put into place, most commentators have argued that
default rules should mimic what the parties would have chosen on their own.24
Because the purpose of contract enforcement is to enforce the intent of the parties,
defaults should arguably follow the intent of the parties, even if the particular intent
is not available.
However, the at-will presumption has become more than just a default rule.
It has become a “sticky” default—a default that is difficult to overcome as a matter

See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Salsbury Chem., Inc., 613 N.W.2d 275, 280 (Iowa 2000). This quote can be
found in over 475 cases dealing with at-will employment. See Westlaw search, (employ! /s "at will" atwill) /p "for any reason or no reason at all", Allcases database, March 10, 2016 (revealing 476 results).
21 Stewart J. Schwab, Life-Cycle Justice: Accommodating Just Cause and Employment at Will, 92 MICH. L. REV.
8, 28 (1993) (“The empirical claim that most private employees are at will is rarely disputed.”). Unions
generally include just-cause provisions within their grievance-arbitration systems. See Rachel ArnowRichman, Just Notice: Re-Reforming Employment at Will, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1, 10 (2010) (“In negotiating
collective terms of employment, unions almost always seek and achieve just cause protection for their
workers, a fact widely observed in the just cause literature.”).
22 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT SECOND OF CONTRACTS § 63 (1981) (providing default for time when
acceptance takes place); id. § 222 (providing default rule for trade-usage evidence); id. § 223 (providing
default rule for course of dealing evidence).
23 See, e.g., U.C.C. §2-305 (providing for a “reasonable price” as a default when the price is not
otherwise set);
§ 2-307 (establishing default rules for delivery lots); § 2-308 (providing default places for place of
delivery); § 2-314 (providing for a default warranty of merchantability).
24 Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99
YALE L.J. 87, 89-90 (1989) (“Few academics have gone beyond one-sentence theories stipulating that
default terms should be set at what the parties would have wanted.”); see also RICHARD POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 372 (3d ed. 1986) (arguing that default rules should “economize on
transaction costs by supplying standard contract terms that the parties would otherwise have to adopt
by express agreement”).
20

6

of common-law doctrine.25 Courts generally do not parse the entire context of the
employment relationship to divine the actual intentions of the parties as to grounds
for termination. Instead, the at-will rule is presumed unless there is fairly convincing
evidence to the contrary. In fact, courts have often ignored evidence of contrary
intent by using idiosyncratic doctrines that ignore or discount such evidence.26
The primary way in which the at-will rule is doctrinally sticky is the power of
the default presumption. The presumption itself is often characterized as “strong”
or “heavy.”27 Courts generally require “unequivocal” or “unambiguous” evidence in
order to overcome the default.28 To take one example, the Texas Supreme Court has
held that for the at-will presumption to be overcome, “the employer must
unequivocally indicate a definite intent to be bound not to terminate the employee
except under clearly specified circumstances.”29 Even an employer statement that the
employee will be discharged only for “good reason” or “good cause” is insufficient
“when there is no agreement on what those terms encompass.”30 Even though atwill is only a default, it overrides evidence to the contrary unless that evidence
unambiguously sets it aside.31
DeMott, supra note 5, at 498, 509; see also Omri Ben-Shahar & John A. E. Pottow, On the Stickiness of
Default Rules, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 651, 677 (2006) (finding the at-will rule to be “highly sticky” as a
default).
26 Rachel Arnow-Richman, The Role of Contract in the Modern Employment Relationship, 10 TEX.
WESLEYAN L. REV. 1, 4 (2003) (“The law of employment contracts is highly idiosyncratic.”); Franklin
G. Snyder, The Pernicious Effect of Employment Relationships on the Law of Contracts, 10 TEX. WESLEYAN L.
REV. 33 (2003) (“The relationship between employment and contract law is peculiar.”).
27 Southward v. FedEx Freight, Inc., 98 F. Supp. 3d 926, 931 (S.D. Ohio 2014) (finding that “[t]here is
a strong presumption of at-will employment” ); Ritter v. Pepsi Cola Operating Co. of Chesapeake &
Indianapolis, 785 F. Supp. 61, 63 (M.D. Pa. 1992) (“In Pennsylvania, there is a very strong
presumption of at-will employment relationships and the level of proof required to overcome this
presumption is arduous.”); E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Pressman, 679 A.2d 436, 440 (Del.
1996) (noting “a heavy presumption that a contract for employment, unless otherwise expressly
stated, is at-will in nature, with duration indefinite”).
28 See, e.g., MARK A. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW 760 (3d ed. 2004) (finding that “[o]ral
representations for permanent employment . . . must be clear and unequivocal enough to overcome
the presumption that employment is at will”); Paul G. Beers, Employment Law, 28 U. RICH. L. REV.
1007, 1040 (1994) (“The employer's promise of continued employment must be unambiguous.”).
29 Montgomery Cty. Hosp. Dist. v. Brown, 965 S.W.2d 501, 502 (Tex. 1998).
30 Id. See also Hayes v. Eateries, Inc., 905 P.2d 778, 783 (Okla. 1995) (requiring “definite and specific
promises by the employer”); Rowe v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 473 N.W.2d 268, 275 (requiring that
“oral statements of job security must be clear and unequivocal to overcome the presumption of
employment at will”).
31 Not all jurisdictions require clear and definite evidence. See, e.g., Berube v. Fashion Ctr., Ltd., 771
P.2d 1033, 1044 (Utah 1989) (“This presumption can be overcome by an affirmative showing by the
plaintiff that the parties expressly or impliedly intended a specified term or agreed to terminate the
relationship for cause alone. Such evidence may be found in employment manuals, oral agreements,
and all circumstances of the relationship which demonstrate the intent to terminate only for cause or
to continue employment for a specified period. Although in the past the presumption in favor of atwill employment has been difficult to overcome, rigid adherence to the at-will rule is no longer
25
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Courts are even less likely to find contextual evidence probative in
overcoming the at-will presumption. California courts were at the vanguard in
looking to evidence such as length of service, industry norms, and informal company
policies in evaluating whether the at-will presumption held in a particular
employment relationship.32 However, the California Supreme Court has retreated a
bit from its original stance, emphasizing the importance of written personnel
documents in evaluating the overall relationship.33 The Court also specified that
while disclaimers of any additional promises of termination protection are not the
final word, neither are they meaningless in interpreting the overall employment
agreement.34 Outside of California, the implied-in-fact exception to the at-will
presumption remains rare, and as in California, it has lost steam over time.35
However, some jurisdictions even go beyond the requirement of strong or
unambiguous evidence to hold that oral evidence itself is insufficient to overcome
the at-will presumption. This is a fairly remarkable change from the normal rule of
contract interpretation. Although the parol evidence rule discharges any agreements
stemming from oral or written negotiations prior to the execution of a completely
integrated written agreement,36 most employment agreements are oral themselves,
and a default “at-will” rule is necessary because the parties have not specified a
termination rule.37 Nevertheless, certain jurisdictions require that any deviation from
the at-will rule be in writing.38 In a similar vein, some jurisdictions have applied the
justified or advisable.”). But cf. Tomlinson v. NCR Corp., 345 P.3d 523, 527 (Utah 2014) (requiring
that “the employer must communicate a manifestation of intent to the employee that is sufficiently
definite to constitute a contract provision”).
32 Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 387 (Cal. 1988) (“In the employment context,
factors apart from consideration and express terms may be used to ascertain the existence and content
of an employment agreement, including the personnel policies or practices of the employer, the
employee's longevity of service, actions or communications by the employer reflecting assurances of
continued employment, and the practices of the industry in which the employee is engaged.”(citation
omitted)).
33 Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc., 8 P.3d 1089, 1102 (Cal. 2000).
34 Id. at 1103-04.
35 Jonathan Fineman, The Inevitable Demise of the Implied Employment Contract, 29 BERKELEY J. EMP. &
LAB. L. 345, 348 (2008) (“Twenty years later, the implied contract doctrine approach to employment
law has been considerably curtailed.”).
36 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND OF CONTRACTS § 213 (1981) (discharging prior agreements to the
extent they are “within [the] scope” of the final agreement).
37 2 CAL. TRANSACTIONS FORMS--BUS. TRANSACTIONS § 12:25 (“Most employees do not work under
a written employment agreement.”).
38 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-1501 (“The employment relationship is severable at the
pleasure of either the employee or the employer unless both the employee and the employer have
signed a written contract to the contrary setting forth that the employment relationship shall remain in
effect for a specified duration of time or otherwise expressly restricting the right of either party to
terminate the employment relationship.”); Payne v. Whole Foods Mkt. Grp., Inc., 812 F. Supp. 2d
705, 708 (E.D.N.C. 2011) (“Employers and employees can exempt themselves from the at-will
presumption by signing a contract with a definite time period of employment.”).
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Statute of Frauds to “permanent” or indefinite contracts that require something
more than at-will for termination. One of the Statute of Frauds’ provisions requires
that a contract be signed and in writing if it “cannot be fully performed within a year
from the time the contract is made.”39 Although an employment contract for an
express term longer than a year would fall within the Statute’s one-year provision, a
contract of indefinite length would not. Even if the contract were to last for many
years, it could be fully performed within a year of its making, as the employee could
die or leave for another job. Thus, indefinite term employment agreements do not
fall within the one-year provisions, and most courts have so held.40 But not all. In
Virginia, courts require that contracts that are terminable for cause must be
construed as setting a definite term for employment, and that term will extend
beyond one year.41 Thus, for-cause agreements must meet the requirements of the
Statute of Frauds. Other courts have held than a contract for lifetime employment
falls within the one-year provision, despite the fact that it can be performed within
one year. Finding the argument that an employee could die within a year to be
“hollow and unpersuasive, one court stated that a lifetime employment contract was
“in essence, a permanent employment contract” that “[i]nherently . . . anticipates a
relationship of long duration—certainly longer than one year.”42 In fact, the court
argued that “[t]o hold otherwise would eviscerate the policy underlying the statute of
frauds and would invite confusion, uncertainty and outright fraud.”43
In addition to clear and, in some cases, written abrogation of the default atwill rule, some states require additional proof to overcome the presumption. New
York requires not only a written statement but also reliance by the employee on the
termination protection. As one court has described it: “the plaintiff must rebut the
presumption of an at will contract by proving the following: 1) there is an express
written policy (often contained in an employee handbook) that limits the employer's
right of discharge; 2) the employer made the employee aware of this policy; and 3)
the employee detrimentally relied on the policy in accepting or continuing
employment.”44 And in perhaps the strangest and most onerous requirement,
RESTATEMENT (SECOND OF CONTRACTS § 130(1) (1981).
See, e.g., Elliot v. Carl H. Winslow, Jr., P.A., 737 So. 2d 609 (Fla. App. 1999); Parker v. Crider
Poultry Inc., 565 S.E.2d 797 (Ga. 2002); Meng v. Trustees of Boston University, 693 N.E.2d 183
(Mass. App. 1998); Montgomery County Hospital Dist. v. Brown, 965 S.W.2d 501 (Tex. 1998);
French v. Sabey Corp., 931 P.2d 204 (Wash. App. 1997).
41 See, e.g., Graham v. Cent. Fid. Bank, 428 S.E.2d 916, 917 (Va. 1993) (“However, if an employment
contract is terminable only for cause, it is one for a fixed period,”); Progress Printing Co. v. Nichols,
421 S.E.2d 428, 430 (Va. 1992) (“We have held that an employment condition which allows
termination only for cause sets a definite term for the duration of the employment. However, the
employment term created by a termination for cause condition, while definite, is not one capable of
being performed within one year.” (citations omitted)).
42 McInerney v. Charter Golf, Inc., 680 N.E.2d 1347, 1351-52 (Ill. 1997)
43 Id. at 1352.
44 Azzolini v. Marriott Int'l, Inc., 417 F. Supp. 2d 243, 247 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); see also Waddell v. Boyce
Thompson Inst. for Plant Research, Inc., 92 A.D.3d 1172, 1173, 940 N.Y.S.2d 331, 332 (2012) (“This
39
40
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employees in some states must provide additional consideration in exchange for the
employer’s promise of just cause or “permanent” employment.45 A contract needs
consideration to be binding, meaning that both parties need to promise to provide a
benefit or suffer a detriment in the context of a bargained-for exchange.46 But in the
context of employment contracts, there is no need for separate consideration for
separate terms; the employee exchanges her labor and additional consideration for
the employer’s wages and additional consideration. Nevertheless, some courts have
created this additional requirement as yet one more hurdle to overcome the
presumption.47
Common-law contract doctrine presumes that each contract has an implied
duty of good faith and fair dealing.48 However, courts have been reluctant to tamper
with the at-will presumption based on principles of good faith. Good faith is not
seen as an appropriate vehicle for diluting the at-will presumption. As the New York
Court of Appeals put it:
No obligation can be implied . . . which would be inconsistent with other
terms of the contractual relationship. Thus, in the case now before us,
plaintiff's employment was at will, a relationship in which the law accords
[at-will] presumption may be rebutted by proof establishing that the employer made the employee
aware of its express written policy limiting its right of discharge and that the employee detrimentally
relied on that policy in accepting the employment.”). Courts have also interpreted New York law to
require a reference in the employer’s personnel manual to a policy other than at-will. See Wanamaker
v. Columbian Rope Co., 907 F. Supp. 522, 540 (N.D.N.Y. 1995) aff'd, 108 F.3d 462 (2d Cir. 1997)
(finding under New York law “an extremely limited exception to the general rule that no cause of
action exists for termination of an at-will employee . . . if the employee demonstrates the following: 1)
the employee was induced to leave his prior employment by the assurance that his employer would
not discharge him without cause; 2) that assurance was incorporated into the employment application;
3) the employee rejected other offers of employment in reliance on the assurance; 4) a personnel
handbook or manual provides that dismissal will be for just cause only.”).
45 RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 2.03 Reporters’ Notes at 69 (2015) (“Some courts remain
wary of purported oral agreements promising permanent or lifetime employment, and require ‘special’
or ‘additional’ consideration besides the promise to perform service.”); ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note
MR1, at 761 (stating that “the doctrine of additional consideration remains relatively intact in cases
involving oral promises, especially if the promise is for permanent employment”).
46 Restatement Second of Contracts § 17.
47 See, e.g., Spacesaver Sys., Inc. v. Adam, 69 A.3d 494, 507-510 (Md. App. 2013) (noting that “an
employment agreement can be negotiated for the life of the employee,” but only “in very rare
circumstances” and may “require ‘special’ or ‘additional’ consideration to be valid.”); Wilder v. Cody
Country Chamber of Commerce, 868 P.2d 211, 218 (Wyo. 1994) (“[A] claim by an employee that the
employer promised ‘permanent’ employment does not alter the at will presumption without additional
consideration supplied by the employee or explicit language in the contract of employment stating
that termination may only be for cause.”); Murphree v. Alabama Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 449 So. 2d
1218, 1221 (Ala. 1984) (holding that lifetime-employment contract is enforceable when employee
provides consideration other than a promise to render services); Henkel v. Educ. Research Council of
Am., 45 Ohio St. 2d 249, 344 N.E.2d 118 (1976) (same).
48 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981); UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-304.
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the employer an unfettered right to terminate the employment at any time.
In the context of such an employment it would be incongruous to say that
an inference may be drawn that the employer impliedly agreed to a
provision which would be destructive of his right of termination. The
parties may by express agreement limit or restrict the employer's right of
discharge, but to imply such a limitation from the existence of an
unrestricted right would be internally inconsistent.49

Although courts have recognized that employees may have claims under the good
faith covenant, they have been limited to situations in which the employee suffers
some particularized loss beyond termination of employment, such as the loss of an
earned bonus.50 In addition, the good faith obligation has been held to forbid the
firing of an employee for doing what they were hired to do.51 However, good faith
has not served to alter the basic nature of the at-will rule dramatically, and some
states do not recognize any duty of good faith in the at-will employment context.52
The cumulative effect of these alterations to traditional common-law
doctrines is to make “at-will” more than just an everyday default rule. Instead, it is a
strong or sticky default – a default rule whose presumption is more difficult to
overcome.53 The doctrinal primacy of the at-will presumption is one of the key
features of the law of the employment contract that renders it such an anomaly
within the common law of contracts more generally.54

Murphy v. American Home Products Corp., 448 N.E.2d 86, 93 (N.Y. 1983); see also RESTATEMENT
§ 2.07 cmt. b (2015) (“Jurisdictions that recognize the implied duty [of good
faith] in the employment setting therefore also recognize that the duty applies to at-will employment
in a manner consistent with the essential nature of such an at-will relationship—namely . . . either
party may terminate the relationship with or without cause.”).
50 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 2.07(c)(1) (2015) (finding a “duty not to terminate
or seek to terminate the employment relationship for the purpose of: (1) preventing the vesting or
accrual of an employee right or benefit”); Fortune v. Nat’l Cash Register, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (Mass.
1977) (employee was allegedly terminated mere days before he would have earned a substantial bonus
in order to deprive him of the bonus).
51 RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 2.07(c)(2) (2015) (finding an employer duty not to
terminate the employee “for the purpose of . . . retaliating against the employee for performing the
employee’s obligations under the employment contract or law”). However, New York has rejected
this approach outside of the context of the attorney rules for professional conduct. See Murphy, 448
N.E.2d at 93; Sabetay v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 506 N.E.2d 919 (N.Y. 1987).
52 RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 2.07 Reporters’ Notes to cmt. (a) (2015) (“Some courts do
not recognize the implied covenant in at-will employment or significantly limit its scope.”); James J.
Brudney, Reluctance and Remorse: The Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing in American Employment Law,
32 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 773, 773-74 (2011) (“The majority of states have declined to apply Good
Faith at all when reviewing disputes between employers and individual employees.”).
53 See DeMott, supra note 5, at 498.
54 See Samuel Issacharoff, Contracting for Employment: The Limited Return of the Common Law, 74 TEX. L.
REV. 1783, 1783-84 (1996) (“As many commentators have noted, there is more than a touch of
doctrinal peculiarity accompanying decisions purporting to rest on formal contract law but presuming
49
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B. The Economic Theory of the At-Will Default
The employment at-will default rule has been the subject of significant
debate within the employment law academy as a matter of doctrine.55 There has also
been a separate debate within the law and economics legal academy on the
appropriateness of default rules such as the at-will rule.56 And that rule has served as
a frequent subject of analysis and discussion within the overall debate on default
rules.
The standard law-and-economics theory for setting default rules is that the
law should endeavor to match what the parties would have selected had they
explicitly bargained over the term.57 The reason that default rules are necessary in
the first place, according to the incomplete contracting literature, is that the parties
face transactions costs in negotiating contractual terms.58 The costs of such
contracting include information costs—determining what needs to be negotiated
into the contract, and how—as well as the costs of negotiating with the other party
on that issue, such as legal fees, conflict creation within the relationship, and delay.59
The theory provides that parties will negotiate to the most efficient contractual term
unless transaction costs outweigh the benefits of contracting.60 Therefore, in order
to reduce the transaction costs of negotiating, as well as to approximate the efficient
result when transaction costs prevent negotiating, the law should set a default rule
that best matches what parties would otherwise have agreed to if they bargained
themselves.61
that all of the elements of a contract exist, or those that find a public policy tort based on highly
contestable articulations of basic societal values.”).
55 Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption
from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1113 (2000) (“[T]he employment law academy has long
debated whether the proper default rule for employment contracts should be that employers may
dismiss employees ‘at will’ or only for ‘just cause.’”).
56 See, e.g., Ayres & Gertner, supra note AG1; Ian Ayres, Regulating Opt-Out: An Economic Theory of
Altering Rules, 121 YALE L.J. 2032 (2012); Ben-Shahar & Pottow, supra note BSP; Eric A. Posner, There
Are No Penalty Rules in Contract Law, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 563 (2006).
57 See Ayres & Gertner, supra note AG1, at 89 (noting the traditional law and economics answer as to
the setting of default rules as “one-sentence theories stipulating that default terms should be set at
what the parties would have wanted”).
58 For a discussion of the incomplete contracting literature, see Richard Craswell, The "Incomplete
Contracts" Literature and Efficient Precautions, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 151 (2005).
59 Ayres & Gertner, supra note AG1, at 92-93 (“These transaction costs may include legal fees,
negotiation costs, drafting and printing costs, the costs of researching the effects and probability of a
contingency, and the costs to the parties and the courts of verifying whether a contingency
occurred.”).
60 See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
61 J. Hoult Verkerke, An Empirical Perspective on Indefinite Term Employment Contracts: The Just Cause Debate,
1995 WIS. L. REV. 837, 842 (1995) (“According to majoritarian default theory, the state maximizes the
joint returns from contracting by providing parties with the term that they would choose for
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The employment at-will default has served as an example of such a “wouldhave-wanted” default. In his classic defense of the at-will presumption, Richard
Epstein argued that the rule best matched with the parties’ interests.62 However, like
other commentators, Epstein’s analysis assumed the pervasiveness of the rule.63 In
an empirical study of the hiring practices at private companies, J. Hoult Verkerke
surveyed employer termination policies to determine whether the at-will rule was the
choice of the contracting parties.64 His study found that just over half of the
employment contracts surveyed included an express confirmation of employment at
will status.65 About one-third of the employers had no specific termination policy,
while fifteen percent had express just-cause provisions.66 Verkerke interpreted this
evidence as a strong indication that the parties preferred the at-will doctrine.67 More
generally, the predominance of the at-will contract—established empirically as well as
anecdotally—is taken as evidence that the at-will default is doing its job.
However, a series of commentators have taken issue with different aspects of
this traditional theory. First, Omri Ben-Shahar and John Pottow argued that
Verkerke’s study contained the seeds of contradiction within its analysis. Noting that
states had varying approaches as to the power of the at-will presumption, Verkerke
predicted that employers in states with more employee-friendly versions of the
default rule would opt out of that rule less frequently, if that default rule was indeed
preferable.68 However, he found no difference in opt-outs between employers in
states with different versions of the rule.69 Verkerke saw this as evidence that a proemployer at-will rule was equally preferable, but Ben-Shahar and Pottow saw the
same evidence as support for the stickiness of the default.70 In their view, a plausible
hypothesis is simply that the at-will rule has become “highly sticky” and thus is
adopted simply by default.71 In support of this view, they noted that the Canadian
province of British Columbia has a default “just cause” rule that can, in fact, be
themselves if there were no transaction costs.”). For an example in the corporate law context, see
Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1416, 1444-45
(1989) (“Corporate law—and in particular the fiduciary principle enforced by courts—fills in the
blanks and oversights with the terms that people would have bargained for had they anticipated the
problems and been able to transact costlessly in advance.”).
62 Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 947, 963 (1984) (discussing
reasons “why the at-will contract usually works for the benefit of both sides in employment”).
63 Verkerke, supra note JHV, at 840-41 (discussing the reliance on “theoretical speculation” and
“secondary and unsystematic” empiricism as to the actual contracting practices in employment).
64 Id. at 865.
65 Id. at 867.
66 Id.
67 Id. at 913 (“The revealed preference of market participants resoundingly endorses an at will
relationship.”).
68 Id. at 881.
69 Id. (discussing Virginia & California).
70 Ben-Shahar & Pottow, supra note BSP, at 676-77.
71 Id. at 677.
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contracted around.72 Relying on anecdotal evidence, they found that most employers
and employees do not contract around the default just-cause rule to get back to an
at-will status.73 Although Canadian employers and employee may, in fact, have a
preference for just cause that their American counterparts do not share, Ben-Shahar
and Pottow did note that transaction costs—at least in the traditional, narrow
sense—do not seem to be responsible for the stickiness of just cause.74
Default rules may also be sticky for reasons other than transaction costs.
Numerous commentators have pointed out that adverse inferences or signals that
may be sent when one party wishes to depart from a default rule.75 Using an
employment relationship in professional sports as an example, Kathryn Spier argued
that an athlete might be loath to negotiate on his own behalf for an injury-protection
clause, for fear that it would signal that he is injury-prone or liable to fake an injury.76
In the context of at-will, an employee who requests just-cause protection is signaling
that she is more likely to have the need of such a clause, and thus more likely to
cause trouble in some fashion.77 In this way, as Walter Kamiat has argued, the
market for an individual employment agreement is like the market for used cars:
because of information asymmetries between buyer and seller, a buyer is prone to
overread signals and suspect the worst when it comes to the quality of the seller’s
goods or services.78 Ultimately, employees may not request just-cause protection,
despite their strong desire for it, because they would be punished too severely in the
market for making such a request.79
Other factors may further compound the stickiness of the at-will default.
One of the cornerstones of research into behavioral heuristics is the endowment
effect: the notion that individuals value something that they own or possess more
Id. at 678-79. The British Columbian system allows for at-will but provides for mandatory
termination benefits. Id. at 678.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 680 (“[I]t cannot simply be a story of transaction costs, because a one-page letter in Canada
can just as effortlessly become a one-and-a-quarter page letter, with a further sentence setting by
contract the termination benefits.”).
75 See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Social Norms and Default Rules Analysis, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 59, 70-72
(1993) (discussing how parties may draw adverse inferences when the other party seeks to depart from
the default rule); Kathryn E. Spier, Incomplete Contracts and Signalling, 23 RAND J. ECON. 432, 433
(1992) (discussing the signaling effects from a departure from a default rule).
76 Spier, supra note KES, at 433.
77 See Walter Kamiat, Labor and Lemons: Efficient Norms in the Internal Labor Market and the Possible Failures
of Individual Contracting, 144 U. PENN. L. REV. 1953, 1958 (1996).
78 See id. at 1957 (discussing George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the
Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970)).
79 Employees can signal as a group that they desire just-cause protection, and they often do so
through their union representatives. The fact that unions uniformly request just-cause protections has
been seen as evidence that all employees actually desire this protection enough to demand it in their
contract. However, this argument is less powerful because of the steep decline in private-sector
unionization.
72
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than something that they can acquire.80 Although the original empirical evidence for
the effect involved mugs,81 scholars have noted the potential for the endowment
effect to apply to legal entitlements such as default rules.82 The endowment effect
would make the default rule stickier by making the default more valuable to the
holder of the default and the alternative rule less valuable to the party that would
negotiate away from it. This effect may be at play in the context of the at-will rule,
as employers may place a higher value on the freedom the at-will rule provides and
employees might undervalue the protections they would receive from just cause.83
Employees may even believe that they already have some legal form of just-cause
protection and therefore not be interested in (redundantly) bargaining for that
protection.84 Finally, there may also be network effects supporting the at-will rule as
a default. The collective advantages from employer use of and comfort with the rule
may enshrine standardization and render deviance from the rule more costly.85
As a result of all of these effects, there may be inefficient “pooling” of
employees around the at-will default, even when such a rule is inefficient.86 In the
face of the hardiness of the at-will rule, there are reasons to consider a change to a
just-cause presumption. A just-cause rule may foster more efficient bargaining
between the parties, as employers are more likely to be informed about the law of
Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47
ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979); Daniel Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the
Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325 (1990); Christine Jolls et. al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and
Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1484 (1998). But see Gregory Klass, Kathryn Zeiler, Against
Endowment Theory: Experimental Economics and Legal Scholarship, 61 UCLA L. REV. 2, 5 (2013) (“Although
endowment theory continues to enjoy considerable influence in the legal literature, recent
experimental data have cast doubt on the hypothesis that ownership sets the reference point and loss
aversion generates reluctance to trade.”).
81 See Kahneman & Tversky, supra note KT1.
82 See, e.g., Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 608,
612 (1998); Cass R. Sunstein, Switching the Default Rule, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 106, 109 (2002).
83 Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption
from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1113 (2000) (“The fact that parties rarely contract
around the ‘at will’ rule might mean that ‘at will’ employment is efficient for most parties, but it also
might mean that the status quo bias swamps a preference many parties would otherwise have for a
‘just cause’ term.”); Sunstein, supra note CS1, at 124 (discussing how both at-will and just-cause
defaults could remain sticky even if parties could bargain freely around it).
84 For empirical evidence on employee beliefs as to termination laws, see Kim, supra note PK-Cornell;
Pauline T. Kim, Norms, Learning, and Law: Exploring the Influences on Workers' Legal Knowledge, 1999 U.
ILL. L. REV. 447 (1999). See also David Charny, Hypothetical Bargains: The Normative Structure of Contract
Interpretation, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1815, 1838-39 (1991) (“Workers, for example, might not realize that
they should not consent to be fired at will, either because they underestimate the costs that this would
impose on them or because they misapprehend the importance of the term to employers.”).
85 See, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Path Dependence in Corporate Contracting Increasing Returns,
Herd Behavior and Cognitive Biases, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 347, 354 (1996) (“The relative certainty that
standard terms offer may lead a lawyer to employ such a term even if the expected value of the term
to his client is lower than the expected value of a customized term.”.
86 See Ayres & Gertner, supra note AG1, at 94-95 (discussing pooling and separating equilibria).
80

15

termination and understand which default is in place.87 They are therefore more
likely to bargain with employees if they wish to change to an at-will regime.88 This
argument aligns with the general notion of “penalty defaults” as a way of overcoming
information asymmetries or strategic bargaining behavior.89 In addition, there are a
set of arguments for a “just cause” regime as a preferable termination rule.90 These
arguments generally focus on the power imbalance between employer and employee,
and the need for some level of protection against termination.91 To the extent that
any default would be sticky, those who prefer a just-cause rule would prefer that it be
the default, even if the parties could contract around it.
Thus, despite the bedrock doctrinal foundation of employment at-will, there
is strong support from law-and-economic theory to question its efficiency as a
default rule. Its bright glow in the legal firmament may overshadow nuances in the
preferences of employers and employees that would lead to a rule that is less blunt
and one-sided. In other words, there is room for reconsidering the contours of the
at-will rule given its stickiness as a default. If a better crafted rule would better serve
the parties’ interests, it may be unlikely that they would arrive at such a rule through
their own bargaining.
II. PERSONAL AUTONOMY AND THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP
A. Defining Personal Autonomy in Employment
Autonomy is the right and ability to control one’s own decisions and actions.
In the context of political science and international relations, autonomy is used to
See Ian Ayres & Alan Schwartz, The No-Reading Problem in Consumer Contract Law, 66 STAN. L. REV.
545, 608 (2014) (discussing the potential for employees to “hold systematically optimistic beliefs about
the default terms of at-will employment contracts”); Charny, supra note DC1, at 1842 (discussing how
a just-cause default may be more efficient, even if it is not the majoritarian contracting choice, if
transaction costs for a just-cause rule are disproportionately high).
88 Sunstein, supra note CS1, at 119 (“[A] switch of entitlement from employer to employee will
increase the likelihood that workers will know what the law has and has not given them, and bargain
accordingly. The optimistic view would be that a switch of that sort might even overcome a market
failure, in the form of inadequate information on the part of employees.”).
89 See Ayres & Gertner, supra note AG1, at 98-99 (discussing how default rules can help incentivize the
sharing of information). See also Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner, Majoritarian vs. Minoritarian Defaults, 51
STAN. L. REV. 1591, 1592 (1999) (“The effect of a particular default rule on information revelation,
and thus on efficiency, depends on numerous characteristics of the contracting environment that are
independent of the ‘hypothetical contracting’ inquiry—that is, merely assessing what the parties would
have contracted for if there were no private information. Other factors, including the distribution of
types, the magnitude of transaction costs, and the distribution of bargaining power, will all affect the
likelihood that a particular penalty default will induce separation and enhance efficiency.”).
90 See, e.g., Blades, supra note LB1.
91 See id.
87
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describe the governance of a nation as independent from outside control or
interference.92 This notion of self-government has carried over from nations to
individuals, as personal autonomy means that the person is in control of her
destiny.93 An autonomous person is one who is independent from the control of
others—free to make decisions about her own life and to act on those decisions
without undue interference from others.94 As Joseph Raz has defined it:
The ruling idea behind the ideal of personal autonomy is that people should
make their own lives. The autonomous person is (part) author of his own
life. The idea of personal autonomy is the vision of people controlling, to
some degree, their own destiny, fashioning it through successive decisions
throughout their lives.95

The term “employee autonomy” covers two different aspects of personal
autonomy: autonomy within the scope of one’s employment, and autonomy outside
of the workplace. Employee autonomy at the workplace means the worker’s right of
control over important aspects of her own working life. For example, Anne Marie
Lofaso has described worker autonomy as “answer[ing] the question: what does it
mean to be part author of one’s working life?”96 Within the context, courts and
commentators have sharply disagreed over the policy ramifications of protecting that
autonomy. The Supreme Court cited to worker autonomy in striking down New
Deal workplace regulations, arguing in Lochner v. New York97 that prohibiting
employees from working overtime was akin to treating them as “wards of the
HENRY CAMPBELL BLACK, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 173(3d ed. 1933) (defining autonomy in
terms of state political autonomy: “the political independence of a nation; the right (and condition) of
self-government; the negation of a state of political influence from without or from foreign powers”);
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY (2d College ed. 1982) (defining autonomy as “the condition or
quality of being self-governing” or “self-government or the right of self-government; selfdetermination; independence”).
93 See MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH: A THEORY OF DEPENDENCY 19
(2004) (“[A]utonomy entails being left alone to satisfy our needs and provide for our own families
without undue restraint.”); C. Edwin Baker, Autonomy and Free Speech, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 251, 253
(2011) (“A person's autonomy might reasonably be conceived as her capacity to pursue successfully
the life she endorses--self-authored at least in the sense that, no matter how her image of a meaningful
life originates, she now can endorse that life for reasons that she accepts.”).
94 Complete autonomy is, of course, impossible within a society. See Baker, supra note CEB, at 253
(“Surely complete autonomy in this sense is never perfectly realized but will exist only more or less on
various continuums.”).
95 JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 369 (1986).
96 Anne Marie Lofaso, Toward a Foundational Theory of Workers’ Rights: The Autonomous Dignified Worker,
76 UMKC L. REV. 1, 39 (2007). She goes on to define worker autonomy as “employees who (1)
know what issues affect their working lives and know how to resolve those issues according to their
own interests; (2) have access to information relevant to making informed decisions; and (3) are free
to effectively decide how to resolve those issues.” Id. at 41.
97 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
92
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state.”98 Other commentators argued, however, that the freedom provided under
laissez-faire capitalism crushes worker autonomy, rather than promoting it.99
Worker autonomy within the employment relationship is really about the role
of the employee within the firm.100 To what extent can employees control their own
work, control the governance of their firm, or control the culture of the firm itself?
These concerns are indeed vital to an employee’s sense of autonomy, but they
involve the relationship between the employee and the firm—namely, the individual
employee’s relationship with the rest of those who are involved in the ongoing
business.101 These are a very different set of issues that the relationship between the
firm and the employee outside of the employment relationship—where, in theory,
there is no reason for the firm to interfere.
Rather than exploring the role of autonomy within the working relationship,
this article addresses the second meaning of “employee autonomy”: personal
autonomy outside of the workplace. In this context, autonomy represents the
employee’s freedom from employer interference in personal matters. Within this
personal sphere, certain types of beliefs, associations, or activities have been more
closely identified with autonomy. In the constitutional context, the Supreme Court
has identified “matters relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family
relationships, and child rearing and education” as particularly important to personal
autonomy.102 Participation in civic life—speaking on matters of public concern,
voting, joining a political party—has also been accorded particular emphasis.103
Id. at 57 (“There is no reasonable ground for interfering with the liberty of person or the right of
free contract, by determining the hours of labor, in the occupation of a baker. There is no contention
that bakers as a class are not equal in intelligence and capacity to men in other trades or manual
occupations, or that they are not able to assert their rights and care for themselves without the
protecting arm of the state, interfering with their independence of judgment and of action. They are in
no sense wards of the state.”). See also Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 174 (1908) (“The right of a
person to sell his labor upon such terms as he deems proper is, in its essence, the same as the right of
the purchaser of labor to prescribe the conditions upon which he will accept such labor from the
person offering to sell it.”).
99 See Clyde W. Summers, Individualism, Collectivism, and Autonomy in American Labor Law, 5 EMPLOYEE
RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 453, 455 (2001) (“The individualism of freedom of contract in employment,
however, does not always, in practice, promote personal autonomy for the workers.”); Lofaso, supra
note AML2007, at 38-48 (arguing that collective rights and actions are necessary to provide workers
with autonomy within the workplace); Jason Bosch, Note, None of Your Business (Interest): The Argument
for Protecting All Employee Behavior with No Business Impact, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 639, 658 (2003) (using the
term “employee autonomy” to refer to off-the-job activities).
100 See Matthew T. Bodie, Employees and the Boundaries of the Corporation, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON
THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE LAW (Claire Hill & Brett McDonnell eds., 2012) (discussing the role
of employees within the corporation).
101 See Matthew T. Bodie, Participation as a Theory of Employment, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 661, 706
(2013) (defining employees as those who participate in the ongoing business enterprise of the firm).
102 Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 600 n.26 (quoting Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976)).
103 The First Amendment’s protection of speech is often justified on the grounds of personal
participation in a system of popular government. See, e.g., Baker, supra note CEB, at 251 (“The
98
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Others have singled out recreational activities for their role in personal meaning and
self-fulfillment.104 These groupings each have their own set of value justifications as
to why they foster a sense of self and human flourishing related to the concept of
autonomy. However, they also each represent a facet of our overall perceptions of
personal autonomy.
This Article defines employee personal autonomy as that zone of activity
outside of the employment relationship that should be outside the employer’s
purview. As one court has framed it: “It may be granted that there are areas of an
employee’s life in which his employer has no legitimate interest.”105 Personal
autonomy represents that zone of activity and belief. And the argument against this
interference is fairly straightforward: it is wrong for the employer to leverage its
power over the employment relationship to change employee behavior that is
unrelated to the relationship. It is taking power in one realm and using it to distort
behavior in another. As Sam Bagenstos has argued, in the context of political
speech:
[I]n each case, an employer is using its economic power over its employees
as leverage to obtain greater power in the political sphere. Workers, fearful
of losing their jobs, will suppress their own political views or express views
with which they do not agree. The result will be a skewed political
discourse, in which employers' voices are amplified and workers' are
squelched.106

At the same time, however, the employer may in fact have significant interests in an
employee’s beliefs, activities, or memberships that make up her personal
legitimacy of the legal order depends, in part, on it respecting the autonomy that it must attribute to
the people whom it asks to obey its laws. Despite the plethora of values served by speech, the need
for this respect, I claim, provides the proper basis for giving free speech constitutional status.”); James
Weinstein, Participatory Democracy as the Central Value of American Free Speech Doctrine, 97 VA. L. REV. 491
(2011) (defending the view that “contemporary American free speech doctrine is best explained as
assuring the opportunity for individuals to participate in the speech by which we govern ourselves”).
See also NEIL RICHARDS, INTELLECTUAL PRIVACY 95 (2015) (discussing intellectual privacy—“a zone
of protection that guards our ability to make up our minds freely”).
104 See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, Employment Law and Social Equality, 112 MICH. L. REV. 225, 250
(2013) (“The opportunity to choose one's own recreational and avocational activities is a key part of
what it means to be a full member of our society. Those are often the activities in which individuals
develop their sense of personal identity and their ties with like-minded people in the community.”).
105 Geary v. U.S. Steel Corp., 319 A.2d 174, 184 (Pa. 1974). The court went on to say: “An intrusion
into one of these areas by virtue of the employer’s power of discharge might plausibly give rise to a
cause of action, particularly when some recognized facet of public policy is threatened.” Id.
106 Bagenstos, supra note SB1, at 256. See also Bosch, supra note JB1, at 644 (“The market fails here, or
at least is suspect, because the employer has the ability to use its power over the employee's livelihood
to gain leverage over other, non-work areas of the employee's life. . . . In essence, strict at-will
employment allows employers to use economic influence to gain social, moral, and even political
influence over their employees.”).
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autonomy.107 Those activities may reflect on the employer’s reputation, may impact
the employee’s relationships with her coworkers, or may create suspicion about the
employee’s unobservable job performance. As a result, the law cannot simply draw a
bright line between on-duty and off-duty conduct. To get a better sense of how the
law has actually managed such conflicts to this point, we now turn to the existing
legal doctrine.
B. Existing Legal Protections for Employee Personal Autonomy
This Article argues for a default common law presumption that employees
and employers agree to shield employee personal autonomy from collateral employer
attack. Before we build the argument for this presumption, however, it is useful to
review the various protections provided under current law for concepts included
within the notion of personal autonomy. These protections provide evidence that
employee personal autonomy is deserving of legal protection.
1. Contractual protections.
Because of the strength of the at-will presumption, the overwhelming
majority of employees have no contractual protections for their own personal
autonomy.108 As argued below,109 there is likely an implicit understanding between
most employees and employers that employees’ private lives are their own business,
and the employers have little interest in the details of those lives. But whatever the
level of these understandings, they are not currently represented within the
employment contract. Instead, employers maintain the right to fire employees “for
any reason, or no reason at all.”110
At-will is just a presumption, however, and employees are free to negotiate
for express protections for their autonomy. The primary way in which employees
receive such protection is through an umbrella “just cause” provision. Individual
employees can negotiate for a “just cause” clause, and there is evidence that a
significant number of high-level executives, academics, and professionals attain such
clauses.111 In addition, unions generally negotiate a “just cause” regime with an
Bagenstos, supra note SB1, at 258 (noting that “[a]ny protection of private employee speech must
take account of legitimate employer interests”).
108 % of employees at-will
109 See Part III.B infra.
110 See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Salsbury Chem., Inc., 613 N.W.2d 275, 280 (Iowa 2000).
111 As to executives, see Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, An Empirical Analysis of CEO
Employment Contracts: What Do Top Executives Bargain For?, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 231, 246 (2006)
(finding that “overwhelmingly, the CEO contracts around at-will default in one way or another”); id.
at 248 (“The overwhelming bulk of CEO contracts . . . are just-cause contracts in the sense that the
CEO gets greater rights if he or she is dismissed without cause.”). As to academics, see John M.
Badagliacca, The Decline of Tenure: The Sixth Circuit's Interpretation of Academic Tenure's Substantive
Protections, 44 SETON HALL L. REV. 905, 905-06 (2014) (“Tenure provides both substantive and
107
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attendant grievance-arbitration process.112 Public sector workers, whether unionized
or not, often are protected by civil service laws that require just cause.113 Employees
whose contracts are for a definite period of time are presumed to have “just cause”
provisions in their contracts.114
In colloquial terms, “just cause” means that the employer must have a good
reason to terminate the employee. However, the set of permissible “good reasons”
expands or contracts in different circumstances. In the context of definite-term
employment, just cause is generally limited to an employee’s failure to perform her
job adequately.115 Executive contracts similarly provide for discharge based on
failure to perform or willful misconduct.116 “Just cause” clauses in collectivebargaining agreements generally focus on whether the employee broke a specific
workplace rule, and if so whether the rule “reasonably related to the orderly,
efficient, and safe operation of the company’s business and the performance that the
company might properly expect of the employee.”117 For the most part, one would
expect that the zone of personal autonomy would lie outside the reasonable or “just”
concerns of employers for purposes of termination decisions. However, even just
cause provisions make allowances for discharge based on “moral turpitude”118 or
“misconduct.”119 In fact, CEO “just cause” clauses often leave out poor
performance as a reason for discharge.120 In such circumstances, discharge may be
limited to the kind of heinous off-duty misconduct that would render the executive
unfit to continue, such as arrest or conviction for a serious crime. However, for less
procedural protections to the tenured employee. The substantive protections prevent unlawful
dismissal—dismissal without adequate cause—while the procedural protections ensure that employers
follow a certain process during the employment and dismissal of any tenured employees.”).
112 RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 2.02 cmt. b (2015) (“These collective agreements typically
provide for an employment relationship other than at-will employment through a ‘just cause’ limit on
discharge and other disciplinary decisions, and a multi-step grievance procedure culminating in final,
binding arbitration before a neutral decisionmaker jointly selected by the parties.”).
113 Pauline T. Kim, Market Norms and Constitutional Values in the Government Workplace, 94 N.C. L. REV.
601, 615 (2016) (“Civil service provisions often require good cause in order to discharge a public
employee, and these protections significantly limit public employers' ability to act arbitrarily, including
in ways that burden their employees' constitutional rights.”).
114 See RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 2.03(a) (2015) (“An employer must have cause . . . for
termination of . . . an unexpired agreement for a definite term of employment . . . .”).
115 Id. § 2.04 cmt. b (“’Cause,’ if not defined in the parties’ agreement, will in these circumstances
usually refers to misconduct, other malfeasance by the employee, or other material breach of the
agreement, such as persistent neglect of duties, gross negligence, or failure to perform the duties of
the position due to a permanent disability.”).
116 Schwab & Thomas, supra note SSRT2006, at 248.
117 See Enterprise Wire Co., 46 LA 359, 363-364 (Daugherty, 1966).
118 Schwab & Thomas, supra note SSRT2006, at 248-49 (finding “moral turpitude” clauses in over
seventy percent of CEO contracts).
119 RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 2.04 cmt. b (2015).
120 Schwab & Thomas, supra note SSRT2006, at 248-49 (“Poor performance on the job does not
constitute cause in most CEO contracts.”).
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prominent employees, cause generally focuses on work-related reasons or the
legitimate business interests of the employer. The inquiry is broader on the business
side, as reasons unrelated to the employee herself may come into play, such as a
business downturn or change in market needs.121 Reasons unrelated to the
employees’ performance or an employer’s legitimate business needs would almost
always fail to meet the cause standard. Arbitrators have followed similar lines in the
collective bargaining context.122
Even in otherwise at-will arrangements, an employer may provide protection
for employees’ private lives by contract. In certain rare circumstances, courts have
determined that an employer impliedly agreed to leave an employee’s private life
alone. In Rulon-Miller v. International Business Machines Corp.,123 an employee was fired
for failing to end a romantic relationship with a former employee who had moved to
a rival company. Critical to the employee’s case was the “Watson Memo,” a
memorandum that the then-chairman of the company had provided on the
separation of work life from personal life. The memo stated in part:
The line that separates an individual's on-the-job business life from his
other life as a private citizen is at times well-defined and at other times
indistinct. But the line does exist, and you and I, as managers in IBM, must
be able to recognize that line.
I have seen instances where managers took disciplinary measures against
employees for actions or conduct that are not rightfully the company's
concern. These managers usually justified their decisions by citing their
personal code of ethics and morals or by quoting some fragment of
company policy that seemed to support their position. Both arguments
RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 2.04 cmt. c (2015) (finding that the “reasonable
presumption” about the definition of just cause in indefinite contracts is “that the parties intended not
only that the employee’s misconduct, malfeasance, inability to perform the work due to permanent
disability, or other material breach may constitute cause for termination, but also that significant
changes in the economic circumstances of the employer can supply such cause”). Cf. Pugh v. See’s
Candies, Inc., 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 928 (1981) (“Care must be taken, however, not to interfere with the
legitimate exercise of managerial discretion. ‘Good cause’ in this context is quite different from the
standard applicable in determining the propriety of an employee’s termination under a contract for a
specified term.”).
122 STEVEN L. WILLBORN, STEWART J. SCHWAB, JOHN F. BURTON, JR. & GILLIAN L.L. LESTER,
EMPLOYMENT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 265 (5th ed. 2012) (“Arbitrators interpreting union
contracts with just-cause provisions rarely uphold discharges for off-work conduct unless the
employer can demonstrate a clear detriment to the workplace.”); Indian Head, Inc., 71 Lab. Arb.
(BNA) 82, 85 (1978) (“arbitrators have long held that what an employee does on his own time and off
Company premises is not a proper basis for disciplinary action unless it can be shown that the
employee’s conduct has an adverse effect on the Company’s business or reputation, the morale and
well-being of other employees, or the employee’s ability to perform his regular duties.”).
123 208 Cal. Rptr. 524 (1st Dist. 1984), overruled on other grounds, Foley v. Interactive Data Corp.,
765 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1988).
121
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proved unjust on close examination. What we need, in every case, is
balanced judgment which weighs the needs of the business and the rights of
the individual.
***
We have concern with an employee's off-the-job behavior only when it
reduces his ability to perform regular job assignments, interferes with the
job performance of other employees, or if his outside behavior affects the
reputation of the company in a major way. When on-the-job performance is
acceptable, I can think of few situations in which outside activities could
result in disciplinary action or dismissal.124

The Watson memo was unusual both for the specificity of its concern (as to
personal autonomy) as well as its focus on company policies relating to discipline and
discharge.125 Although not framed in terms of an employee’s contract, the memo
provided strong evidence of a company policy protecting employee personal
autonomy. The court held that “this company policy insures to the employee both
the right of privacy and the right to hold a job even though ‘off-the-job behavior’
might not be approved of by the employee’s manager.”126 However, most
companies have not embraced a version of the Watson memo for their own
employees, nor have courts hastened to imply contractual protections for employee
personal autonomy in other cases. Thus, contract law currently does not provide
specific protections for employee personal autonomy, and the parties generally do
not contract for such protections.
2. Privacy protections.
Theorists and law-makers have long struggled over the definition of
privacy.127 Famously, Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis described privacy
protection as “the right to be let alone,” which they further elucidated as “the right
of determining, ordinarily, to what extent [a person’s] thoughts, sentiments, and
emotions shall be communicated to others.”128 Scholars have attempted different
definitions, but most break down privacy into different sets of privacy interests.129
Id. at 530.
Id. (“When such situations do come to your attention, you should seek the advice and counsel of
the next appropriate level of management and the personnel department in determining what
action—if any—is called for. Action should be taken only when a legitimate interest of the company
is injured or jeopardized. Furthermore the damage must be clear beyond reasonable doubt and not
based on hasty decisions about what one person might think is good for the company.”).
126 Id.
127 See ANITA L. ALLEN, PRIVACY LAW AND SOCIETY 3 (2011) (“‘The right to privacy’ frustrates
theorists who believe the law’s use of the term ‘privacy’ has been especially confusing.”).
128 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 195, 198 (1890).
129 For example, Daniel Solove has identified four sets of privacy invasions: information collection,
information processing, information dissemination, and invasions into private affairs. DANIEL
124
125
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Certain of these privacy interests line up fairly closely with out notions of
personal autonomy. In its breakdown of privacy interests, the Supreme Court
described a person’s “interest in independence in making certain kinds of important
decisions” as one kind of privacy interest.130 Similarly, California has interpreted its
constitutional privacy protections,131 which extend into the private sphere, to include
the interest in “making intimate personal decisions or conducting personal activities
without observation, intrusion, or interference .”132 One example of the so-called
“autonomy privacy” interest in the context of employment comes from a case in
which an employer requested private medical information from an employee’s
doctors and then, based on that information, required the employee to undertake an
alcohol treatment program or be fired.133 Along with his privacy interest in keeping
his medical history to himself, the employee also “had an ‘autonomy privacy’ interest
in making intimate personal decisions about an appropriate course of medical
treatment for his disabling stress condition, without undue intrusion or interference
from his employer.”134 The California appeals court analyzed this right under the
state’s constitutional privacy doctrine, and found that the employee had a reasonable
expectation of privacy as making his own medical decisions, and that the intrusion
into the employee’s privacy was a serious one.135 Similarly, courts have at times
treated employer efforts to influence private employee decisions as invasions of
privacy.136

SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 103-05 (2008). Anita Allen has identified six types of privacy
from everyday usage: physical privacy, informational privacy, decisional privacy, proprietary privacy,
associational privacy, and intellectual privacy. ALLEN, supra note AA2011, at 4-5. And William
Prosser identified four types of privacy invasions deserving of protection through tort: intrusion upon
seclusion, unreasonable publicity to private life, publicity that places another in a false light, and
appropriation of name or likeness. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960).
130 Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598-600 (1977). See also Vega-Rodriguez v. Puerto Rico Telephone
Co., 110 F.3d 174,183 (1st Cir. 1997) (“The autonomy branch of the Fourteenth Amendment right to
privacy is limited to those decisions arising in the personal sphere—matters relating to a marriage,
procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and the like.”).
131 CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1.
132 See also Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 865 P.2d 633, 654 (Cal. 1994) (“Legally
recognized privacy interests are generally of two classes: (1) interests in precluding the dissemination
or misuse of sensitive and confidential information (‘informational privacy’); and (2) interests in
making intimate personal decisions or conducting personal activities without observation, intrusion,
or interference (‘autonomy privacy’).”).
133 Pettus v. Cole, 49 Cal. App. 4th 402, 457 (Cal. App. 1996).
134 Id. at 458.
135 Id. at 458-63.
136 In Cunningham v. Dabbs, 703 So. 2d 979 (Ala. Civ. App. 1997), a supervisor subjected the plaintiffemployee to frequent episodes of sexual harassment. When the supervisor learned that plaintiff was
getting married, he fired her. The court rejected the employee’s wrongful-discharge claim, but it
denied summary judgment as to her intrusion-upon-seclusion and outrage claims. Id. at 982 (noting
that marriage and “sexual concerns” are entitled to privacy protections).
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However, other concepts of privacy also relate to our notions of autonomy,
albeit more peripherally. The Supreme Court’s definition of autonomy includes not
only the interest in independence in making important personal decisions,137 but also
the interest in “avoiding disclosure of personal matters.”138 This more common
definition of privacy139 does not directly relate to the employee’s ability to engage in
off-duty activities outside of the workplace. However, it can help to facilitate
personal, non-workplace autonomy by providing a zone of private activity and
information into which the employer cannot penetrate. The Fourth Amendment’s
protection against unreasonable searches can protect public employees from having
to disclose activities or beliefs that occur off-duty.140 The Court has held that
constitutional reasonableness requirements apply to “searches” of the employee’s
body, blood, or urine which may reveal personal conduct outside of employment.141
Similarly, the Supreme Court has assumed the existence of a right to informational
privacy, which allows employees to keep certain kinds of information private,
including information about off-duty activities.142 It is important differentiate
between information privacy interests and autonomy interests, as the right to
informational privacy only protects the employee from an inquiry or surveillance of
such activity; it does not protect the employee’s autonomy interests in engaging in
the activity. However, these concepts work together. Privacy protects employees
against employer efforts to delve into matters of personal autonomy. Autonomy
reflects the employee’s ability to engage in autonomous behavior, whether publicly
or not; privacy allows her to keep this behavior private.
The Restatement of Employment Law breaks down employee privacy
interests into three categories: (1) the privacy of places, such as the physical person,
Interestingly, this autonomy aspect to the right to privacy within the U.S. Constitution has been
interpreted in such a way that it is largely irrelevant in the workplace context. The Court has
interpreted “interest in independence in making certain kinds of important decisions” to focus on
“matters relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child rearing and
education.” Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 600 n.26 (1977) (citing Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713
(1976)).
138 Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598-600 (1977).
139 In her study of privacy, Christena Nippert-Eng found overwhelming support for the definition of
privacy as “the ability/power to control access to some thing, place, or piece of information and its
dissemination.” CHRISTENA NIPPERT-ENG, ISLANDS OF PRIVACY 7 (2010). Defining privacy as “[t]he
freedom to do/live/make decisions, without regulation/restriction” received significantly less
support. Id.
140 The Fourth Amendment protects individuals “against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S.
CONST. amend. IV. This protection applies to employees when the government acts in its capacity as
employer. See Nat'l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665 (1989) (“[T]he Fourth
Amendment protects individuals from unreasonable searches conducted by the Government, even
when the Government acts as an employer ....”).
141 See id. (upholding the reasonableness of the search); Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n,
489 U.S. 602 (1989) (same).
142 National Aeronautics & Space Admin. v. Nelson, 562 U.S. 134, 151-54 (2011) (discussing the
employer’s inquiry into drug use and wide-ranging opinions of personal references).
137
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homes, workplaces, or electronic “locations,” (2) the privacy of personal
information, and (3) the privacy of preventing disclosure to third parties of private
employee information disclosed to the employer.143 All three of these privacy
interests can facilitate an employee’s personal autonomy interests. Protections
against invasions into private places can help keep an employee’s personal life free
from employer observation or influence. Courts have found that employees have
privacy interests in their homes,144 hotel rooms,145 lockers,146 bathrooms,147 laptops,148
and text messages.149 These are all areas where personal autonomy activities may take
place. Similarly, privacy protections have applied to personal information—
including information about conduct or beliefs related to autonomy.150 In particular,
courts have provided privacy protections to information about an employee’s sexual
practice or history.151 However, almost all courts have held that romantic
relationships between coworkers—particularly those between supervisors and
subordinates—are matters of workplace concern and do not constitute private
RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW §7.02 (2015).
Saldana v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 443 N.W.2d 382, 384 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989) (finding intrusion (but
no liability) when investigator took pictures inside employee’s home using a telephoto lens).
145 Sowards v. Norbar, Inc., 605 N.E.2d 468, 474-75 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992) (finding intrusion and
liability when employer searched employee’s hotel room).
146 K-Mart Corp. Store No. 7441 v. Trotti, 677 S.W.2d 632, 637-38 (Tex. App. 1984).
147 See, e.g., Elmore v. Atlantic Zayre, Inc., 341 S.E.2d 905, 906-07 (Ga. 1986); Harkey v. Abate, 346
N.W.2d 74, 76 (Mich. App. 1983); Kjerstad v. Ravellette Publications, Inc., 517 N.W.2d 419, 422
(S.D. 1994).
148 Hilderman v. Enea TekSci Inc., 551 F. Supp. 2d 1183, 1204 (S.D. Cal. 2008) (“Whether [former
employee] had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the personal data saved on the computer
depends on whether [the employer] still had a policy of allowing employees to purchase their
laptops.”).
149 City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 766-67 (2010) (assuming that police employees had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in personal text messages, but upholding police department’s search
as reasonable under the Fourth Amendment).
150 As one court stated: “highly personal questions or demands by a person . . . may be regarded as an
intrusion on psychological solitude or integrity and hence an invasion of privacy.” Van Jelgerhuis v.
Mercury Finance Co., 940 F. Supp. 1344, 1368 (S.D. Ind. 1996). See also Cort v. Bristol-Myers Co.,
431 N.E.2d 908, 912 n.9 (Mass. 1982) (“This opinion simply acknowledges that in the area of private
employment there may be inquiries of a personal nature that are unreasonably intrusive and no
business of the employer and that an employee may not be discharged with impunity for failure to
answer such requests.”).
151 See Van Jelgerhuis, 940 F. Supp. at 1368 (series of questions and suggestions about employees’ sex
lives); Aguinaga v. Sanmina Corp., Not Reported in F. Supp., 1998 WL 241260, *1 (N.D. Tex. 1998)
(supervisor asked employee intrusive and suggestive questions about her sexual activity); Busby v.
Truswas Sys. Corp., 551 So. 2d 322, 323 (Ala. 1989) (plant supervisor intruding into employees’ sex
lives); Phillips v. Smalley Maintenance Services, 435 So. 2d 705, 711 (Ala. 1983) (employer questioning
of employee about sexual activities with husband); Cunningham v. Dabbs, 703 So. 2d 979 (Ala. Civ.
App. 1997) (improper inquiries into personal sexual proclivities); Guccione v. Paley, 2006 WL
1828363, *2 (Conn. Super. June 14, 2006) (employer questions about employee’s sexual relation; s
with her boyfriend); Bonanno v. Dan Perkins Chevrolet, 2000 WL 192933, *1 (Conn. Super. Feb. 4,
2000) (defendant’s comments regarding plaintiffs’ sex life, appearance, and values).
143
144
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behavior. 152 As to the last category, employers may have information about an
employee’s off-duty conduct, such as health-related matters or aptitude, that deserves
protection against further dissemination.153
3. Antidiscrimination protections.
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act provides employees with protections
against discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.154 Many
states and localities also provide protection against similar kinds of status
discrimination.155 Discrimination against employees with regard to their relatively
See, e.g., Rogers v. International Business Machines, 500 F. Supp. 867, 869 (W.D. Pa. 1980) (finding
that employee’s termination because of a relationship with a subordinate was based on employer’s
“legitimate interest in preserving harmony among its employees and in preserving its normal
operational procedures from disruption”); Barbee v. Household Automotive Finance Corp., 6 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 406, 411 (App. 2003) (recognizing employer interests in avoiding conflicts of interest
between work-related and family-related obligations, reducing favoritism or even the appearance of
favoritism, and preventing sexual harassment); Crosier v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 198 Cal. Rptr.
361, 366 (App. 1983) (finding that the employer was “legitimately concerned with appearances of
favoritism, possible claims of sexual harassment and employee dissension created by romantic
relationships between management and nonmanagement employees”), disapproved of on other
grounds by Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1988); Patton v. J.C. Penney Co., 719
P.2d 854, 857 (Or. 1986) (finding no tortious conduct for termination based on relationship with
coworker), abrogated on other grounds by McGanty v. Staudenraus, 901 P.2d 841 (Or. 1995);
Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 335 N.W.2d 834, 842-43 (Wis. 1983) (same). However, at least one
court has held open the possibility in dicta that an employer’s actions concerning a consensual
relationship between employees could be tortious. Mercer v. City of Cedar Rapids, 104 F. Supp. 2d
1130, 1180 (N.D. Iowa 2000) (stating that “intrusion upon the privacy of an employee’s off-duty,
consensual relationship with another coworker might be highly offensive in private sector
employment”).
As a corollary, off-duty contact between coworkers would falls outside the protections for
autonomy. See, e.g., Manning v. Department of Employment Sec., 850 N.E.2d 244, 245-46 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1st Dist. 2006) (employee’s conduct in leaving a vulgar message on a coworker’s personal voice
mail after work was misconduct harmful to the employer). However, note that collective activity
between employees is protected under the National Labor Relations Act. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 157,
158(a)(1) (2012).
153 See, e.g., Miller v. Motorola, Inc., 560 N.E.2d 900 (Ill. App. 1990) (holding that employer had a duty
not to disseminate information about employee’s mastectomy); Karraker v. Rent-A-Center, Inc., 411
F.3d 831 (7th Cir. 2005) (finding that employer had a responsibility as to its handling of the
personality and aptitude test results); Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge No. 5 v. City of Philadelphia,
812 F.2d 105 (3d Cir. 1987) (same).
154 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
155 Harvey S. Mars, The Conflicting Legal Standards for Mixed-Motive Employment Discrimination Claims: A
Comparison of the ADEA and Title VII, N.Y. ST. B.J., May 2015, at 34 (“There are a great many federal,
state, and local laws that prohibit employment discrimination on the basis of statutorily protected
classifications—such as gender, race, color, disability, national origin, religion, and age.”); Chad A.
Readler, Local Government Anti-Discrimination Laws: Do They Make A Difference?, 31 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 777 (1998) (“Legislation protecting individuals from discrimination in private employment
has been enacted throughout the United States at the federal, state, and local levels.”).
152
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fixed characteristics such as race, color, sex, or national origin does not fall within
the definition of infringements upon autonomy, as autonomy is based on voluntary
beliefs and conduct.156 Similarly, federal protections against age discrimination157 and
disability discrimination158 do not affect employee activities or beliefs, but rather
aspects of their person. Title VII has been construed to provide protection against
stereotypical notions about how an employee of a certain sex or race should act.159
However, this approach has had its limits.160 Employers are still entitled to mold
employees into a certain image on the job.161 And for our purposes, Title VII’s
protections against stereotyping are largely related to employee autonomy on the job,
rather than off.162
Protections provided by Title VII against sexual harassment can also protect
employee autonomy. The Supreme Court has defined sexual harassment as
“permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently
severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment.”163 But a
harasser seeks to invade the employee’s personal zone of privacy and may even seek
a romantic or sexual relationship with the employee. It is no surprise than many
cases of harassment allege not only Title VII violations, but also invasions of
personal privacy.164
Personal autonomy considerations become even stronger when the employer
seeks to discriminate based on religion. Rather than being a largely immutable
characteristic, one’s religion is largely a personal decision that can be subject to
employer pressure. Religion and religious practice is a zone of activity and belief that
falls in the heartland of employee personal autonomy.165 Title VII’s protections for
religion offer important safeguards for this aspect of employee autonomy. In fact,
Cf. Sharona Hoffman, The Importance of Immutability in Employment Discrimination Law, 52 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1483, 1545 (2011) (making the case that if federal antidiscrimination protections are
based on immutability, they should also extend to “immutable characteristics such as sexual
orientation, appearance, parental and marital status, and political affiliation”).
157 29 U.S.C. § 623 (2012).
158 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (2012).
159 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (recognizing sex stereotyping as a method of
discrimination).
160 See Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Company, Inc., 444 F.3d 1104, 1109-10, 1112 (2006) (holding
that differential grooming requirements based on sex do not violate Title VII if they do not impose
unequal burdens and do not impose “impermissible” stereotypes).
161 For a critique of the branding requirements on employees, see Marion Crain, Managing Identity:
Buying into the Brand at Work, 95 IOWA L. REV. 1179 (2010).
162 See Dianne Avery & Marion Crain, Branded: Corporate Image, Sexual Stereotyping, and the New Face of
Capitalism, 14 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 13, 24 n.57 & 31 (2007) (discussing the importance of
appearance autonomy to workers).
163 Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (quoting in part Meritor Savings Bank v.
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65, 67 (1986)).
164 See Part II.B.2 supra.
165 E. Gregory Wallace, Justifying Religious Freedom: The Western Tradition, 114 PENN ST. L. REV. 485, 491
(2009) (discussing religion as a matter of personal autonomy).
156
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Title VII extends beyond the personal and into the workplace, as the employer has a
duty to accommodate the employee’s religion in a reasonable fashion.166
Sexual orientation is another area of personal autonomy that has received
antidiscrimination protection.167 The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
has recently brought suit alleging that discrimination based on sexual orientation is
“because of” sex.168 Under current law, many states and localities specifically
prohibit sexual orientation discrimination in employment,169 and a federal law to that
effect has been proposed and passed the United States Senate.170
4. Tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy.
The wrongful discharge and discipline tort protects employees against
employer discrimination based on their actions in support of public policy.171 The
tort is intended to encourage employee behavior in the workplace that benefits third
parties. But in a larger sense, the tort calls upon the notion that employees are not
only participants within their firm, but also citizens within a larger community.172
Employees are at times expected to heed the call to a higher sense of duty, and it
makes sense for society to protect them while they engage in that type of activity.

29 C.F.R. § 1605.2 (finding that the employer violates Title VII if it “It is a violation of the statute
to “fail[s] to reasonably accommodate the religious practices of an employee or prospective employee,
unless the employer demonstrates that accommodation would result in undue hardship on the
conduct of its business”).
167 Cf. Vega-Rodriguez v. Puerto Rico Telephone Co., 110 F.3d 174,183 (1st Cir. 1997) (“The
autonomy branch of the Fourteenth Amendment right to privacy is limited to those decisions arising
in the personal sphere—matters relating to a marriage, procreation, contraception, family
relationships, child rearing, and the like.”).
168 See Complaint, EEOC v. Scott Medical Health Center, P.C., (W.D. Pa., No. 2:16-cv-00225-CB,
filed March 1, 2016) (alleging that employer discriminated against employee on the basis of sex in
violation of Title VII when it subjected him to harassment because of his sexual orientation and/or
because he did not conform to the employer's gender-based expectations, preferences, or stereotypes).
169 SHANNON MINTER, 1 SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW § 10:9 (March 1, 2016 ed.) (“Twentyone states and the District of Columbia prohibit employment discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation.”).
170 Employment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA) of 2013, S. 815, 113th Cong. (as passed by Senate,
Nov. 7, 2013). ENDA passed the U.S. Senate in 2013 but was never brought up for a vote in the U.S.
House of Representatives. Aglae Eufracio, Venturing into A Minefield: Potential Effects of the Hobby Lobby
Decision on the LGBT Community, 18 SCHOLAR: ST. MARY'S L. REV. & SOC. JUST. 107, 140 (2016).
President Obama wrote an op-ed article in support of ENDA. Barack Obama, Congress Needs to Pass
the Employment Non-Discrimination Act, HUFF. POST, Nov. 3, 2013,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/barack-obama/enda-congress_b_4209115.html.
171 For a discussion of the tort, see RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW §§ 5.01-5.03 (2015).
172 See, e.g., Sheets v. Teddy’s Frosted Foods, Inc., 427 A.2d 385, 388 (Conn. 1980) (“We are . . .
mindful of the myriad of employees without the bargaining power to command employment
contracts for a definite term are entitled to a modicum of judicial protection when their conduct as
good citizens is punished by their employers.”).
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Courts have thus focused on employer discrimination that “strike[s] at the heart of a
citizen’s social rights, duties, and responsibilities.”173
Many of the protected activities under the public policy tort fall within the
zone of personal autonomy or its penumbra. One of the earliest and most influential
of the public policies to be protected under the common law was the duty of jury
service.174 Courts have also protected employees for engaging in the criminal justice
process,175 participating in a judicial or regulatory process,176 or abiding by
professional ethics.177 However, courts have also rejected certain public policy claims
for being too closely related to personal interests.178 The crux of the tort is the
protection of socially-advantageous behavior. As described by one court: “public
policy must concern behavior that truly impacts the public in order to justify
interference into an employer's business decisions.”179 As such, autonomy concerns
are generally secondary to the primary concern: encouragement of actions that
benefit the public.
One court endeavored to establish one aspect of personal autonomy—
namely, political beliefs and participation—as a public policy worthy of protection
under the wrongful discharge and discipline tort. In Novosel v. Nationwide Insurance
Co.,180 the Third Circuit read Pennsylvania law as permitting wrongful discharge
claims where a clear mandate of public policy has been violated.181 According to the
complaint, John Novosel had worked as a district claims manager at Nationwide
Insurance until he refused to participate in the employer’s lobbying effort for a
particular reform to Pennsylvania insurance regulation. Novosel claimed that his
refusal to bow to the employer’s political will violated Pennsylvania public policy.
The Third Circuit agreed. Citing to a line of political expression protections for

Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 878-79 (Ill. 1981).
See, e.g., People v. Vitucci, 199 N.E.2d 78, 79 (Ill. App. 1964) (stating that an employer who
discharged an employee who was absent because of jury duty was guilty of contempt of court); Nees
v. Hocks, 536 P.2d 512 (Or. 1975).
175 Palmateer, 421 N.E.2d at 879 (employee was fired for participating in “the enforcement of [the]
State’s criminal code”); Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 610 P.2d 1330, 1336 (Cal. 1980) (same).
176 See, e.g., Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 384 N.E.2d 353, 357 (Ill. 1978) (employee filed a workers
compensation claim).
177 LoPresti v. Rutland Regional Health Services, Inc. 865 A.2d 1102 (Vt. 2004); Rocky Mtn. Hosp. &
Med. Serv. v. Mariani, 916 P.2d 519 (Colo. 1996). See Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 417 A.2d
505 (N.J. 1980) (“The sources of public policy include legislation; administrative rules, regulations, or
decisions; and judicial decisions. In certain instances, a professional code of ethics may contain an
expression of public policy.”).
178 See, e.g., Scroghan v. Kratco Corp., 551 S.W.2d 811, 812 (Ky. App. 1977) (no claim when employee
terminated after announcing his intentions to attend law school at night).
179 Rocky Mtn. Hosp. & Med. Serv. v. Mariani, 916 P.2d 519, 525 (Colo.1996).
180 721 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1983).
181 Id. at 898 (citing Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 319 A.2d 174, 180 (Pa. 1974), and Reuther v.
Fowler & Williams, Inc., 386 A.2d 119, 120 (Pa. Super. 1978)).
173
174
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public sector employees,182 the Novosel court held that “these cases suggest that an
important public policy is in fact implicated wherever the power to hire and fire is
utilized to dictate the terms of employee political activities.”183 The court remanded
the case for further consideration as to whether Novosel met the specific
requirements of the tort.
The Novosel decision has received substantial criticism from courts both
inside and outside of Pennsylvania. Nine years after the decision, the Third Circuit
declined to extend the Novosel approach of relying on a federal constitutional
provision to provide public policy.184 Citing to a series of lower-court opinions in
Pennsylvania, the circuit found that “the clear trend of those cases indicates that the
Pennsylvania courts would be highly unlikely to extend Novosel.”185 Other courts
have disapproved of Novosel’s notion that the First Amendment’s protections for
political activity and speech extend to the private sector.186 Rather, they have applied
the general rule as stated in Truly v. Madison General Hospital,187 that “one does not
always insure his own retention in employment by wrapping oneself in the first
182 Id. at 899-901 (citing inter alia Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968); Elrod v.
Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976); Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980); and Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138
(1983)).
183 Id. at 900.
184 Borse v. Piece Goods Shop, Inc., 963 F.2d 611, 620 (3d Cir. 1992).
185 Id. Interestingly, one judge on the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas went on a jeremiad
against Novosel, stating that the decision was “[p]erhaps the most glaring example of the federal courts
pre-disposition toward dictating policy preferences that are contrary to Pennsylvania's.” Shick v.
Shirley, 1995 WL 864462, at *10 n.7 (Pa. Com. Pl. 1995). However, that court’s ruling—that the tort
of public policy did not extend to the filing of a workers’ compensation claim—was later overruled by
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Shick v. Shirley, 716 A.2d 1231, 1238 (Pa. 1998). And more
recently, two Pennsylvania opinions have cited Novosel favorably, although as to the general notion of
public policy. Weaver v. Harpster, 975 A.2d 555, 564 (Pa. 2009); Nazar v. Clark Distribution Systems,
2000 WL 1616785, *34 (Pa. Com. Pl. 2000).
186 See, e.g., Dixon v. Coburg Dairy, Inc., 330 F.3d 250, 262 (4th Cir. 2003) (applying S.C. law)
(declining to reach “the absurd result of making every private workplace a constitutionally protected
forum for political discourse”), rev’d on other grounds, 369 F.3d 811 (4th Cir. 2004) (en banc); Grinzi
v. San Diego Hospice Corp., 14 Cal. Rptr. 3d 893, 900 (Cal. App. 4th 2004) (“We do not find [Novosel]
persuasive and also decline to adopt it.”); Edmondson v. Shearer Lumber Products, 75 P.3d 733, 738739 (Idaho 2003) (Novosel policy not “endorsed by any other court”); Shovelin v. Central New Mexico
Elec. Co-op., Inc., 850 P.2d 996, 1010 (N.M. 1993) (“We did not, however, adopt the approach taken
by the Third Circuit in Novosel and are not inclined to adopt that approach now.”); Tiernan v.
Charleston Area Medical Center, Inc., 506 S.E.2d 578, 588-591 (W. Va. 1998) (rejecting the Novosel
approach in a lengthy discussion); Barr v. Kelso-Burnett Co., 478 N.E.2d 1354, 1356 (Ill. 1985)
(constitutional guarantee of free speech provided by Illinois and U.S. Constitutions does not provide
protection or redress against private individuals or corporations that seek to abridge free expression of
others); Graebel v. American Dynatec Corp., 604 N.W.2d 35 (Table), 1999 WL 693460 (Wis. App.
1999) (“Although we recognize a wrongful discharge claim when an employer’s actions violate a
clearly mandated public policy, the public policy exception may not be used to extend constitutional
free speech protection to private employment.” (quoting Bushko v. Miller Brewing Co., 396 N.W.2d
167, 172 (Wis. 1986))).
187 673 F.2d 763 (5th Cir.1982).
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amendment and launching attacks on one's employer from within its folds. At some
point, while the employer has no right to control the employee's speech, he does
have the right to conclude that the employee's exercise of his constitutional privileges
has clearly over-balanced his usefulness and destroyed his value and so to discharge
him.”188
The Novosel court clearly believed that First Amendment protections
extended into the workplace to protect the employee’s political expression.189 The
case presents a tough question as to whether the political expression at issue would
be included in a notion of personal autonomy that existed outside of the workplace.
On the one hand, the employer wanted the employee to provide support during
work time, and the political issue directly involved the employer’s business.190 On
the other hand, the employer may have been looking for the employee’s personal
endorsement as to the issue, rather than simply his support as an employee.191 It is
unclear whether employees were simply expected to solicit signatures from others, or
whether the employees were also expected to personally endorse the bill through
their own signatures.192 If the employer was looking for the employee to simply
obtain signatures, it appears that the conduct at issue was wholly within the scope of
Novosel’s employment. Along these lines, the cases that have rejected the Novosel
holding involved employee conduct that was within the employment relationship,
was potentially unlawful, or infringed upon the employer’s legitimate business
interests.193 Thus, the many rejections of Novosel are not necessarily rejections of
legal protections for personal autonomy interests.

Id. at 767.
Novosel v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 721 F.2d 894, 900 (3d Cir. 1983).
190 Id. at 896.
191 The opinion states that the employer “solicit[ed] the participation of all employees in an effort to
lobby the Pennsylvania House of Representatives. Specifically, employees were instructed to clip,
copy, and obtain signatures on coupons bearing the insignia of the Pennsylvania Committee for NoFault Reform.” Id.
192 Samuel Bagenstos has argued that employer efforts to direct employee political activity “threaten
social equality because they enable the company to transform its economic power over its employees
into an additional voice in the political realm. And that additional voice enhances the company's
political power while at the same time squelching the political power of its employees.” Bagenstos,
supra note SB2013, at 227.
193 See Dixon, 330 F.3d at 254-255 (no public-policy protection for Confederate flag on tool box that
would be visible to coworkers); Grinzi, 14 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 896 (no protection for employee’s
membership in Women’s Garden Circle, an investment group that the employer believed to be an
illegal pyramid scheme); Edmondson, 75 P.3d at 736 (no protection for employee’s involvement in
local- government task force that concerned issues vital to the employer’s interest, particularly when
employee opposed employer’s interests); Shovelin, 850 P.2d at 1010 (no protection for employee
serving as local mayor; employer warned employee prior to election that mayoral duties would
interfere with employee’s ability to perform the job); Tiernan, 506 S.E.2d at 588-591 (no protection for
employee’s letter, published by newspaper, that was critical of and sarcastic towards the employer);
Barr, 478 N.E.2d at 1355 (plaintiffs had, prior to said discharge by the defendants, informed fellow
188
189
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5. State off-duty activity statutes.
Personal autonomy takes the front seat when it comes to state “off-duty” or
“lawful activity” statutes. These statutes can be grouped in several categories of
protections. At the thinnest level, a set of state statutes protect employees from
discharge or discipline because of their use of “lawful products,” sometime specified
as alcoholic beverages and tobacco.194 These protections, passed through the
influence of purveyors of those products, require that employees use the products
outside of the employment relationship—off duty, and not on employer premises.195
Five states offer significantly broader protections for all off-duty conduct, with some
variations. Mississippi’s provision protects against interference with employees’
“social, civil, or political rights,” but it only provides for civil damages of $500.196
California, Colorado, and North Dakota provide for protections for all lawful
activities off the employer’s premises and outside of working hours.197 Finally, New
York provides protection specifically for “legal recreational activities.”198
employees of layoff procedures being utilized); Graebel, 604 N.W.2d 35, 1999 WL 693460 at *1
(employee fired because of letter to local newspaper using racially inflammatory expressions).
194 CONN. GEN. STAT. §31-40s (applying solely to smoking or tobacco products); D.C. CODE ANN.
§7-1703.03 (smoking or tobacco); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 55/5 (applying to “lawful products”); IND.
CODE ANN. §22-5-4-1 (tobacco products); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 344.040 (smoking); LA. REV.
STATE. ANN. § 23:966 (smoking); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 597 (tobacco products); MINN. STAT.
§ 181.938 (lawful consumable products); MISS. CODE ANN. § 71-7-33 (smoking or tobacco products);
MO. REV. STAT. § 290.145 (lawful alcohol or tobacco products); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2-313
(lawful products); NEV. REV. STAT. § 613.333 (lawful use of a product); N.H. REV. STAT. §275:37-a
(tobacco products); N.J. STAT. ANN. §34:6B-1 (tobacco products); N.M. STAT. § 50-11-3 (smoking or
tobacco products); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-28.2 (lawful products); OKLA. STAT. tit. 40, § 500 (smoking
or tobacco products); OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.315 (tobacco products); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-20.10-14
(smoking or tobacco products); S.C. CODE ANN. § 41-1-85 (tobacco products); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§ 60-4-11 (tobacco products); TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-1-304 (referring to “product” or “agricultural
product” that is “not regulated by the alcoholic beverage commission”); VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-1504
(smoking or tobacco products); W. VA. CODE § 21-3-19 (tobacco products); WIS. STAT. ANN. §
111.321 (lawful products); WYO. STAT. § 27-9-105 (tobacco products).
195 Matthew W. Finkin, “Lawful Activity” Laws, in WORKPLACE PRIVACY: PROCEEDINGS OF THE NEW
YORK UNIVERSITY 58TH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 409, 412 (2010) (“At the behest of
commercial interests a large number of states have protected the specific right to consume a lawful
product—alcohol, tobacco, or both—off the employer’s premises and on the employee’s own time.”).
196 MISS. CODE § 79-1-9 (providing for a penalty of $250 along with damages to the employee of an
equal amount).
197 See CAL. LAB. CODE § 98.6 (providing a private cause of action for discharges based on Cal. Labor
Code § 96(k), which protects “lawful conduct occurring during nonworking hours away from the
employer's premises”); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-34-402.5(1) (stating that employers may not
terminate an employee “due to that employee’s engaging in any lawful activity off the premises of the
employer during nonworking hours unless such a restriction (a) [r]elates to a bona fide occupational
requirement or is reasonably and rationally related to the employment activities and responsibilities of
a particular employee or a particular group of employees . . . or (b) [i]s necessary to avoid a conflict of
interest with any responsibilities to the employer . . . .”); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 14-02.4-03, -08
(outlawing discrimination “because of . . . participation in a lawful activity that is off the employer’s
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The intent of these broader statutes is clearly to protect employee personal
autonomy outside of work. As one court described the Colorado law:
[T]he law was meant to provide a shield to employees who engage in
activities that are personally distasteful to their employer, but which
activities are legal and unrelated to an employee's job duties. In application,
this statute should protect the job security of homosexuals who would
otherwise be fired by an employer who discriminates against gay people,
members of Ross Perot's new political party who are employed by a fervent
democrat, or even smokers who are employed by an employer with strong
anti-tobacco feelings. . . . The one common thread that links all of these
examples is that the statute shields employees who are engaging in private
off-the-job activity, that is unrelated to the employees[‘] job duties, from
termination for participation in the non-work related activities.199

However, courts are wary of any activities that actually infringe upon the employer’s
interests. A sharp line is meant to be drawn between activities in which the employer
has a legitimate business interest, and those in which it does not. For example, in the
case excerpted above, the Court found that the employee was not protected when he
wrote a letter to a newspaper critical of the company.200 Even if an activity takes
place while the employee is not at work, the employer can generally take action
against the employee if the off-duty conduct harms the employer’s reputation or
ability to carry on business with the employee.
There are also some points of debate about whether certain kinds of
activities fall within the “lawful activities” definition. For example, a Colorado
employee’s use of marijuana off the job for medical reasons was held not to be a
“lawful” activity since it was illegal under federal law, even though it was legal under
state law.201 New York has had more ongoing disputes about the content of its
definition, as courts have taken the “recreational” part of the term as a critical piece.
Anti-fraternization policies which prohibit employees from engaging in romantic or
sexual relationships have been upheld under the statute, as dating was held not to
constitute a recreational activity. As the court explained in New York v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc.:202
premises and that takes place during nonworking hours” unless the participation is “in direct conflict
with the essential business interests of the employer” or “contrary to a bona fide occupational
qualification that reasonably and rationally relates to employment activities”).
198 N.Y. LAB. LAW § 201-d (outlawing discrimination because of “an individual’s legal recreational
activities outside work hours, off of the employer’s premises and without use of the employer’s
equipment or other property”).
199 Marsh v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1458, 1462-63 (D. Colo. 1997).
200 Id. at 1463.
201 Coats v. Dish Network, LLC, 350 P.3d 849, 853 (Colo. 2015) (“Coats's use of medical marijuana
was unlawful under federal law and thus not protected by section 24–34–402.5.”).
202 207 A.D.2d 150 (N.Y. App. 1995).
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To us, “dating” is entirely distinct from and, in fact, bears little resemblance
to “recreational activity”. Whether characterized as a relationship or an
activity, an indispensable element of “dating”, in fact its raison d'etre, is
romance, either pursued or realized. For that reason, although a dating
couple may go bowling and under the circumstances call that activity a
“date”, when two individuals lacking amorous interest in one another go
bowling or engage in any other kind of “legal recreational activity”, they are
not “dating”.203

The dissent, however, argued that “[t]he statute, by its terms, appears to encompass
social activities, whether or not they have a romantic element, for it
includes any lawful activity pursued for recreational purposes and undertaken during
leisure time.”204 And while the Second Circuit adopted Wal-Mart’s reading of the
statute, one judge attacked the interpretation in a concurrence, stating: “It is
repugnant to our most basic ideals in a free society that an employer can destroy an
individual’s livelihood on the basis of whom he is courting, without first having to
establish that the employee’s relationship is adversely affecting the employer’s
business interests.”205
6. Constitutional and statutory protections for political speech and affiliation.
In Pickering v. Board of Education,206 the Supreme Court held that the First
Amendment protected public-sector employee speech. The famous “Pickering
balancing test”207 has since been modified to require that the speech be on a matter
of public concern208 and outside of the scope of their employment.209 However,
government employees do enjoy significant protections to engage in political and
free speech expression without employer interference. “The First Amendment limits
the ability of a public employer to leverage the employment relationship to restrict,

Id. at 152.
Id. at 153 (Yesawich Jr., J., dissenting).
205 McCavatt v. Swiss Reinsurance American Corp., 237 F.3d 166, 169-70 (2d Cir. 2001) (McLaughlin,
C.J. concurring).
206 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
207 See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006) (“Pickering and the cases decided in its wake
identify two inquiries to guide interpretation of the constitutional protections accorded to public
employee speech. The first requires determining whether the employee spoke as a citizen on a matter
of public concern. If the answer is no, the employee has no First Amendment cause of action based
on his or her employer's reaction to the speech. If the answer is yes, then the possibility of a First
Amendment claim arises. The question becomes whether the relevant government entity had an
adequate justification for treating the employee differently from any other member of the general
public.” (citations omitted)).
208 Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
209 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
203
204
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incidentally or intentionally, the liberties employees enjoy in their capacities as private
citizens.”
These protections are even stronger in the context of political associations. Public
employees cannot be fired for belonging to a particular political party unless such an
affiliation is an appropriate requirement for effective performance of the office.210
Although private-sector employees are not protected by the First
Amendment, many states prohibit employer adverse actions based on employee
political activities and expressions.211 Nine states make it a crime to try to prevent,
restrain, or influence an employee’s political activity by threatening discharge or
otherwise trying to prevent the conduct.212 A number of other states provide
protection for political activity, political-party affiliation, campaign contributions, and
exercising the right to vote.213 Federal law provides for a civil action against a
conspiracy to “prevent, by force, intimidation, or threat, any citizen who is lawfully
entitled to vote, from giving his support or advocacy in a legal manner” to a federal
elected official.214 New Mexico makes it a felony to discharge or threaten to
discharge an employee “because of the employee’s political opinions or belief, or
because of such employee’s intention to vote or refrain from voting for any
candidate, party, proposition, question, or constitutional amendment.”215 Two states
prohibit discrimination against employees on the basis of party membership.216
Three states protect employees against discrimination based on engagement in

Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976); Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980). Individuals who hold
policymaking positions where “the hiring authority can demonstrate that party affiliation is an
appropriate requirement for the effective performance of the public office,” Branti, 445 U.S. at 518,
are protected against politically-motivated dismissal. See, e.g., Embry v. City of Calumet City, Illinois,
701 F.3d 231 (7th Cir. 2012).
For a description of the differences between the First Amendment’s protections for free
speech and political affiliation, see Craig D. Singer, Comment, Conduct and Belief: Public Employees’ First
Amendment Right to Free Expression and Political Affiliation, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 897 897-98 (1992).
211 Eugene Volokh, Private Employees’ Speech and Political Activity: Statutory Protection Against Employer
Retaliation, 16 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 295, 297 (2012) (“About half of Americans live in jurisdictions that
protect some private employee speech or political activity from employer retaliation.”).
212 See CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1101, 1102; COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-2-108 (misdemeanor); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 23:961, 23:962 (misdemeanor); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 10A.36 (gross misdemeanor); MO.
ANN. STAT. §§ 115.637(6); 130.028 (misdemeanors); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-1537 (class IV
felony); NEV. REV. STAT. § 613.040, S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-17-560; W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3-8-11
(misdemeanor). California, Colorado, and Louisiana have specific provisions for employees to seek
damages for violations of their provisions.
213 For a comprehensive discussion of these statutes, see Volokh, supra note EV2012, at 303-34.
214 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (2012).
215 N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-20-13, 3-8-78.
216 See IOWA CODE ANN. § 39A.2(c)(4); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18:1461.4(A)(1); see also D.C. CODE
§§ 2-1401.02(25), 2-1402.11(a); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 29, § 140 (Puerto Rico); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §
64-1(a) (U.S. Virgin Islands).
210
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electoral activities.217 Eight states provide protections for the signing of electoral
petitions, such as referenda and recall elections.218 Louisiana, Massachusetts, and
Oregon have specific protections for campaign contributions. 219
Connecticut has taken the significant step further of applying First
Amendment protections as a whole to private sector employees through a state
statute.220 The statute provides that employers, including both private and
government employers, must not subject employees to discipline or discharge on
account of their exercise of First Amendment rights “provided such activity does not
substantially or materially interfere with the employee's bona fide job performance or
the working relationship between the employee and the employer.”221 Although the
statute has been interpreted to cover First Amendment activity on the job as well as
off,222 the Connecticut courts have imported in the “matters of public concern”
test223 as well as the absence of protection for speech that is part of the employee’s
job duties, as applied to First Amendment claims.224 Even prior to the Supreme
Court’s decision in Garcetti, claims under § 31-51q had been subjected to fairly
stringent “public concern” analysis, which did not include speech that was “directed

See 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/29-17; N.Y. LAB. LAW § 201-d; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
42.17A.495(2).
218 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 19-116, 19-206; GA. CODE ANN. § 21-4-20(b); IOWA CODE ANN. §
39A.2; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18:1461.4(A)(1); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 211C.09; MO. ANN. STAT. §
115.637(6); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 731.40; OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 260.665(1)-(2); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 29A.84.250(4), 29A.94.220(5).
219 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18:1461.4(A)(1); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 56, § 33; OR. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 260.665(1)-(2).
220 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-51q.
221 Id.
222 Cotto v. United Techs. Corp., 738 A.2d 623, 632 (Conn. 1999) (finding that § 31-51q “extends
protection of rights of free speech under the federal and the state constitutions to employees in the
private workplace”). Not all Connecticut justices have agreed. See id. at 634 (Borden, J., concurring
and dissenting) (concluding that “the statute is intended to reach only speech or conduct of a private
employee that, based on its location or circumstance, is or would be protected against governmental,
and not private, action”); Trusz v. UBS Realty Inv'rs, LLC, 123 A.3d 1212, 1235 (2015) (Zarella, J.,
concurring) (“A proper reading of § 31–51q extends protections to private sector employees only
from discipline or discharge [resulting from] the exercise of their constitutionally guaranteed free
speech rights outside of the workplace.”).
223 Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
224 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006); Schumann v. Dianon Sys., Inc., 43 A.3d 111, 128 (Conn.
2012) (applying the Garcetti threshold test to claims under § 31-51q). The Court went on to hold that
the employee speech at question in the case would also not have received protection under the
traditional Pickering test as well. Id. at 134-37. The Connecticut Supreme Court recently held that it
would not apply Garcetti in its interpretation of speech rights under the Connecticut Constitution.
Trusz v. UBS Realty Inv'rs, LLC, 123 A.3d 1212, 1228 (Conn. 2015) (“Because we find Pickering and
Connick to be more persuasive than Garcetti, we conclude that the weight of persuasive federal
precedent favors a broader reading of the free speech provisions of the state constitution than of the
first amendment.”).
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‘only’ at issues concerning [the employee’s] employment.”225 The Connecticut
Supreme Court recently held that “only comment on official dishonesty, deliberately
unconstitutional action, other serious wrongdoing, or threats to health and safety can
weigh out in an employee's favor when an employee is speaking pursuant to official
job duties.”226 In other words—there must be a public policy component to the
workplace speech if it is to be protected.
III. PROTECTING EMPLOYEE AUTONOMY THROUGH THE COMMON LAW
The multitude of protections for employee personal autonomy, appearing in
various shapes and guises, demonstrate its importance within the employment
relationship. But this patchwork of coverages has little doctrinal or logical
consistency. Courts and legislatures have selected small pieces of autonomy to
protect, or have carved out larger chunks for a limited set of employees, such as
those in the public sector. Stepping back, as if from a pointillist painting, we can see
a broader picture of coverage for autonomy interests. But the collection of
individual dots lacks the comprehensiveness that the subject deserves.
State legislatures, or even Congress, could step in and protect employee
personal autonomy through off-duty or lawful activity statutes.227 Numerous
commentators have proposed the widespread adoption of such statutes.228 However,
this Article specifically looks at the ways in which the common law could approach
the issue of employee personal autonomy.
Courts control the basic dynamics of the employment relationship through the
common law of contract. Although federal and state statutes provide manifold
overlays on top of this foundation, the common-law core represents the basis for
Daley v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 734 A.2d 112, 125 (Conn. 1999). In Daley, the employee had
complained about the employer’s failure to abide by its public statements regarding its family-friendly
workplace. The jury found that such speech was not on a matter of public concern, and the
Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed. Id.
226 Trusz, 123 A.3d at 1228.
227 Colorado or North Dakota off-duty activities statutes could serve as models. COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 24-34-402.5(1); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 14-02.4-03, -08.
228 See, e.g., Rafael Gely & Leonard Bierman, Social Isolation and American Workers: Employee Blogging and
Legal Reform, 20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 287, 326-28 (2007); Marisa Anne Pagnattaro, What Do You Do
When You Are Not at Work?: Limiting the Use of Off-Duty Conduct as the Basis for Adverse Employment
Decisions, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 625, 680-83 (2004); Bosch, supra note JB1, at 660 (“[T]he
legislatures of all fifty states should adopt expanded lifestyle protection legislation that fully protects
all employee activities that do not have a sufficient impact on the employer's legitimate business
interests.”); Joseph Lipps, Note, State Lifestyle Statutes and the Blogosphere: Autonomy for Private Employees in
the Internet Age, 72 OHIO ST. L. J. 645, 673-85 (2011) (proposing federal and state legislation). See also
Lewis L. Maltby & Bernard J. Dushman, Whose Life Is It Anyway - Employer Control of Off-Duty Behavior,
13 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 645, 658 (1994) (supporting reform to existing state off-duty statutes as
well as the implementation of such statutes in states without one).
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any agreement between employer and employee. As such, courts have a duty to
manage the law surrounding this relationship. The at-will presumption only increases
the role of courts, as that presumption dictates the tone for much to follow. Because
the at-will rule plays such an important role in shaping the employment relationship,
courts must attend to the at-will doctrine and make the changes necessary to reflect
the appropriate balance between parties. And, on a pragmatic level, courts could
implement a tort or mandatory contract rule that would work similarly to an off-duty
or political activity wrongful discharge statute. Thus, discussion of both would be in
some senses duplicative.
This Part considers two ways in which courts could change the common law
to protect employee personal autonomy. First, courts could use the tort of wrongful
discharge to protect the public policy of employee autonomy. Second, courts could
modify the at-will doctrine to include a presumption that the employer will not
discharge an employee based on activities or beliefs that take place within the zone
of personal autonomy. These possible approaches will be taken in turn.
A. Protecting Personal Autonomy through the Tort of Wrongful Discharge
Courts could protect employee personal autonomy through the tort of
wrongful discharge for violations of public policy.229 The purpose behind the tort is
to protect broader societal interests within the employment relationship. The tort
provides mandatory, nonwaivable protections to employees because the interests at
stake go beyond the two parties involved.230 The third-party or public interests
provide the employee with the prerogative to deviate from the dictates of the
relationship to respond to the higher calling. In order to encourage and protect
employees to serve the public, they are given immunity from employer retaliation.231
Certain aspects of the tort mesh well with the notion of protecting employee
autonomy. Courts are responsive to the notion that civic responsibilities need public
protection. It was relatively straightforward for courts to provide protections for
jury service232 and participation in criminal investigations.233 It is a relatively small
See RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 5.01-5.03 (2015) (describing the wrongful discharge
tort).
230 See id. § 5.01 cmt. a (“A principal justification for this public-policy cause of action is that,
regardless of the terms of the employment, certain discharges that contravene well-established norms
of public policy harm not only the specific employees but also third parties and society as a whole.”).
231 A specific example of a public interest is the enforcement of the nation’s laws, which can be found
in the Supreme Court’s antiretaliation jurisprudence. See Richard Moberly, The Supreme Court's
Antiretaliation Principle, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 375, 378 (2010) (describing the Court’s
“Antiretaliation Principle” as “the notion that protecting employees from retaliation will enhance the
enforcement of the nation's laws”).
232 See, e.g., People v. Vitucci, 199 N.E.2d 78, 79 (Ill. App. 1964); Nees v. Hocks, 536 P.2d 512 (Or.
1975).
233 Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 878-79 (Ill. 1981); Tameny v. Atlantic
Richfield Co., 610 P.2d 1330, 1336 (Cal. 1980).
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step to include participation in political life, through association or expression, as
public policy worthy of nurturing. Expanding the coverage to include religious
participation stays within the First Amendment, and may seem relatively
uncontroversial given the protections provided for religion under Title VII.234
At its core, however, the public policy tort is designed to protect public
interests. Protecting jury service and criminal investigations allows the judicial
system to function. Protecting reports of wrongdoing to the press or law
enforcement facilitates the flow of information that may save lives. There is a strong
argument that protecting political expression and association inures to the benefit of
the public, but the rewards are less tangible. And protecting other recreational or
off-duty activities does not have the same power of public policy that the traditional
tort has required.235
The reaction of many courts to the Novosel v. Nationwide Insurance Co.236
demonstrates the perils of protecting autonomy through the wrongful discharge tort.
Although the response has become more muted, courts were initially quite hostile to
the Novosel decision, even at a time when courts were more willing to entertain
challenges to the at-will doctrine.237 Some of this blowback may reflect simply an
unwillingness to move beyond the at-will rule. However, other courts argued that
the extension of public policy to cover First Amendment values had gone too far.
The First Amendment restricts the government, not private actors, they argued.238
As such, it was a misconception to bring in public policy concerns to police the
conduct of purely private actors as to First Amendment expression and conduct.
Courts have also been concerned about the First Amendment rights of
employers. Those rights may be infringed upon if government requires employers to
continue to associate with employees even when the employer would otherwise
terminate the relationship based on the employee’s political, religious, or moral
expressions.239 In Nelson v. McClatchy Newspapers, Inc.,240 the Washington Supreme

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012).
Gely & Bierman, supra note GB1, at 326 (“It is one thing for state courts to say that employees
cannot be fired for being on jury duty—virtually all do so—and quite another to say that employees
cannot be fired for anything related to a very broadly construed notion of ‘public concern.’”).
236 721 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1983).
237 See notes 184-188 supra.
238 See, e.g., Borse v. Piece Goods Shop, Inc., 963 F.2d 611, 620 (3d Cir. 1992), as amended (May 29,
1992) (predicting that “if faced with the issue, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would not look to the
First and Fourth Amendments as sources of public policy when there is no state action”); Bushko v.
Miller Brewing Co., 396 N.W.2d 167, 172 (Wis. 1986) (“Although we recognize a wrongful discharge
claim when an employer’s actions violate a clearly mandated public policy, the public policy exception
may not be used to extend constitutional free speech protection to private employment.”).
239 See Bagenstos, supra note SB1, at 259 (“There remains the question whether a law prohibiting
private employers from controlling their workers' political speech—even with the exceptions I have
suggested—would be consistent with current First Amendment doctrine. After all, an employer's
interests in this context—in avoiding having others attribute speech with which it disagrees to it, and
234
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Court held that an employee was statutorily protected against termination for
participating in political rallies while off-duty.241 However, the court then went on to
find the statute to be an unconstitutional restriction on the company’s First
Amendment rights to freedom of the press.242 The newspaper’s requirement that its
reporters not engage in partisan political activity was an editorial decision vital to the
content of its reporting, found the court.243 These concerns may arguably be limited
to First Amendment institutions such as media outlets, churches, universities, and
political parties.244 However, the need to protect the heightened speech, association,
and free exercise rights of these organizations underlines the more general point that
all organizations have First Amendment interests. The Supreme Court highlighted
these interests in Citizens United v. Federal Communications Commission,245 finding that
First Amendment protects extend to political speech by a corporation.246 And in
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.,247 the Court held that corporations can have
religious identities sufficient to deserve protections for their religious-exercise rights
as organizations.248 Imposing a tort framework to protect these interests would make
it more difficult for corporations to balance their own expressive concerns with
those of their individual employees.
Ultimately, tort protection represents a commitment to vindicate public
values through a cause of action that imposes requirements upon the employment
relationship. It is thus more akin to statutory protection for off-duty autonomy
(whether as a whole or just component pieces such as political participation). It is a
societal judgment. Such judgments generally come from the legislative branch,
which explains why courts have insisted upon constitutional or legislative
pronouncements to derive the meaning of public policy.249 Moreover, a tort places
the ultimate judgment on the interests to be protected in the hands of courts. Courts
would define the type of employee conduct that deserves protection and the strength
in engaging in political speech of its own—are interests that the Supreme Court has found to be
constitutionally based.”).
240 936 P.2d 1123 (Wash. 1997).
241 Id. at 1128. The statute in question—Washington’s Fair Campaign Practices Act—protected
employees against discrimination based on the employee’s actions “in any way supporting or opposing
a candidate, ballot proposition, political party, or political committee.” Rev. Code Wash. §
42.17.680(2).
242 Nelson, 936 P.2d at 1129.
243 Id. at 1131 (“Editorial integrity and credibility are core objectives of editorial control and thus merit
protection under the free press clauses.”).
244 See PAUL HORWITZ, FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTIONS (2013) (discussing the role of such
institutions in First Amendment jurisprudence).
245 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
246 Id. at 899-900.
247 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
248 Id. at 2771 (“If for-profit corporations may pursue such worthy [humanitarian and altruistic]
objectives, there is no apparent reason why they may not further religious objectives as well.”).
249 RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW §§ 5.03 (2015) (discussing sources of public policy).
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of the employer interests required to overcome that protection.250 There are
advantages to putting the court in the position to judge the balancing of interests, as
employers are likely to undervalue the employee interests at stake and overvalue
employer interests.251 However, there are also disadvantages in taking this balancing
out of the hands of the parties, especially when the balancing can be so contextdependent on the company’s business, the employee’s role within the company, and
the employee conduct, membership, or belief at issue.
Regardless of whether society wishes to impose this new requirement on the
employment relationship, it makes sense first to explore whether the relationship
itself already accounts for the concerns.252 An appropriate reading of the at-will rule
should, in fact, take into account the separation between the employee relationship
and the employee’s off-duty conduct. We should to begin with the notion that the
parties themselves have agreed to protect employee autonomy before we turn to tort.
B. Contractual Protection for Personal Autonomy: Changing the At-Will Default
As discussed in Part I, the employment at-will default rule is extremely robust
both in doctrine and practice. As a matter of doctrine, it is more than just a simple
gap-filler, as courts have erected procedural and even consideration hurdles for
parties seeking to overcome the presumption.253 And as a matter of economic
theory, there is reason to believe that the default rule might remain in place even
when a change to that rule might result in greater efficiency.254 Rather than a simple
default rule, it is a sticky default—a default that is hard to shake.255
The stickiness of the employment at-will doctrine is particularly problematic,
because the justifications for the rule do not support its stickiness. One justification,
both for at-will and for default rules more generally, is that the default rule makes
sense because it is the rule that most of the sets of parties would jointly choose for
See Bagenstos, supra note SB1, at 258-59 (describing exemptions for a regime of employees political
speech protections for “cases in which speaking or refusing to speak on a particular topic can be
regarded as a BFOQ”).
251 Id. at 259 (arguing that tort-based or statutory protections for employee speech “would eliminate
some of the employer's traditional prerogative to define employees' jobs” and “resist[] an employer's
ability to casually and opportunistically leverage its economic power over the speech of employees
whom the employer can control simply because of the employees' economic dependence on the
enterprise”); Finkin, supra note MF-2010, at 422 (“If what one does off the job, in one’s private life,
however lofty or trivial, is an aspect of one’s personality, a component of one’s being human, it
remains to be seen why the law should presume it to be an element of the wage bargain; why, that is,
it should be considered a commodity subject to almost no legal restraint on the market.”).
252 See Ayres & Gertner, supra note AG1, at 88 (“Immutable rules displace freedom of contract.
Immutability is justified only if unregulated contracting would be socially deleterious because parties
internal or external to the contract cannot adequately protect themselves.”).
253 See Part I.A supra.
254 See Part I.B supra.
255 See Ben-Shahar & Pottow, supra note BSP, at 677 (calling the at-will rule “highly sticky”).
250
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their contract if they were required to bargain over the issue. Thus, the argument
goes, the default rule should match what most parties would have chosen in the
absence of transaction costs.256 However, it makes no sense for such a rule to be
sticky, because the whole point is to save the parties from needless transaction costs
while at the same time making it as easy as possible for them to depart from the
default rule, should they wish. If the justification for the rule is to save transaction
costs, it makes no sense to make it more difficult to switch out of the default.
Instead, the rule should be as unsticky—as greased—as possible to allow the parties
to switch out to a more efficient solution.
There is also little justification for making the at-will rule sticky as a penalty
or information-forcing default. First, in order to be a penalty default, the rule would
have to not be what most parties would choose—that is what makes it a penalty. So
a penalty default justification is off the table for those accounts that justify
employment at-will as a “would have wanted” default.257 But assuming that we take
that off the table, employment at-will is constructed poorly to force information out
of the parties.258 The employer is the party with better information about the costs
of at-will versus just cause, at least on a broader, economic scale. Employers are also
less likely to suffer significant reputational consequences from changing the default
rule: it is more damaging to an individual employee to be seen as a malcontent or
poor performer, as the individual has much less market power and has few ways in
which to provide other information to counteract the negative signaling.259
Finally, a third justification for the at-will rule is that it is a superior
termination rule to any alternative. Were this agreed to be true, then we would want
the at-will rule to be as sticky as possible to prevent the parties from mistakenly
choosing a different option. Richard Epstein, notably, provided a zealous defense of
at-will making several arguments: because at-will allows the parties to better monitor
each other’s contract performance; because employers will suffer reputational
consequences if they abuse their at-will discretion; because at-will allows for risk
diversification in the midst of imperfect information; and because the administrative
costs of an at-will regime are less than just cause.260 But these points do not seem
indisputable enough to justify a sticky default. As Epstein himself acknowledged, the
efficiency and equity of the at-will rule have been contested by numerous other
academics.261 Moreover, Epstein noted that the default nature of at-will is one of its
Ayres & Gertner, supra note AG1, at 92-93.
Id. (explaining the “would have wanted” term). Examples of such accounts include Epstein, supra
note RE1, and Verkerke, supra note RHV1.
258 See Ayres & Gertner, supra note AG1, at 97 (justifying penalty defaults for “1) giving both
contracting parties incentives to reveal information to third parties, especially courts, or 2) giving a
more informed contracting party incentives to reveal information to a less informed party”).
259 See Kamiat, supra note WK1.
260 Epstein, supra note RE1, at 962-73.
261 Id. at 948 (noting that academic commentators “have been almost unanimous in their
condemnation of the at-will relationship”). More recent critiques include: Cynthia L. Estlund,
256
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beneficial features.262 He argued against a just cause default on the grounds that
courts might in fact make it too sticky to be shed.263
Because defaults are by their nature sticky, to varying degrees, and the at-will
presumption seems to be particularly sticky, it is important that the rule be tailored to
match the expectations of the parties to the extent possible. The at-will rule, in its
purest form, is an extremely untailored default: it gives unalloyed discretion to the
employer to terminate the relationship for any reason. Over time, however, the rule
has been eaten away at, both through the common law and by statutes.264 The
wrongful discharge tort prohibits terminations that harm public interests, while a
panoply of antidiscrimination regimes make it illegal to fire based on race, sex, sexual
orientation, disability, religion, and age. These impositions on at-will are mandatory
rules, not default ones. They indicate the need to manage the stark and unrbridled
discretion that at-will would otherwise allow.
This Article argues that we need further tailoring of the at-will rule, but this
time as a default. The law should presume that the parties did not agree that an
employee could be terminated for conduct that does not occur within the context of
the employment relationship and has no significant impact upon the employment
relationship. This “personal-autonomy presumption” makes sense within the at-will
doctrine: it assumes that the parties will not base decisions affecting the contractual
relationship on factors that take place outside of that relationship.265 It assumes that
the employer will not leverage its employment power to force workers to follow its
dictates that are unrelated to employment. It keeps contractual performance within
the contractual sphere, which is exactly where we would expect the parties to place it.
Thus, an at-will rule with a personal-autonomy presumption is thus best considered
as a “tailored default”—an effort to frame the contract as what the parties would
have agreed to in the absence of transaction costs, reputation costs, behavioral
heuristics, and other bargaining obstructions.266
Wrongful Discharge Protections in an at-Will World, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1655, 1657 (1996) (arguing that the atwill regime imposes underappreciated costs on employee discrimination and retaliation claims); David
Millon, Default Rules, Wealth Distribution, and Corporate Law Reform: Employment at Will Versus Job Security,
146 U. PA. L. REV. 975, 1028-30 (1998) (arguing that the default rule should be changed from at-will
employment to a “just cause” regime because the just cause regime may better represent an efficient
outcome between the parties); and Summers, supra note CS-2000.
262 Epstein, supra note RE1, at 951 (“[T]he parties should be permitted as of right to adopt this form
of contract if they so desire.”).
263 Id. at 952 (“By degrees, the original presumption against the contract at will could so gain in
strength that a requirement that is waivable in theory could easily become conclusive in fact.”).
264 See Estlund, supra note CE-1996, at 1655 (“The at-will rule now coexists with numerous important
exceptions—statutory and common law, state and federal—that prohibit the discharge of employees
for particular bad reasons.”).
265 Cf. Fineman, supra note JF-2008, at 356 (“Employers should not be able to foster employee
expectations about job security, and then act in contravention of those expectations after reaping
increased employee productivity and loyalty.”).
266 See Ayres & Gertner, supra note AG1, at 91.
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The personal-autonomy presumption also provides another layer of
protection for off-duty employee conduct, activities, and beliefs. The plethora of
statutory and common-law provisions described in Part II.B offer variegated
protections for different aspects of employee autonomy. These protections provide
indirect evidence that the parties expect some level of personal autonomy as a matter
of contracting. But they also show that society as a whole values personal autonomy
and has put in place different legal regimes to shield it from employer attack. Given
the many mandatory rules in place regarding aspects of personal autonomy, it makes
sense to switch the default rule to a setting that also protects personal autonomy.
For these reasons, the personal-autonomy presumption makes sense even as a
penalty default. Assuming that employers would strongly prefer to contract back to
an at-will rule without the personal-autonomy presumption, changing the default
would penalize employers who are not clear about their expectations as to important
personal conduct outside of the workplace. By forcing employers to address the
issue, the autonomy default would promote clearer interactions between employers
and employees as to the boundaries of the employment relationship.267 For these
reasons, a default rule that requires “clear” or “unambiguous” intent to circumvent it
may do a better job of forcing information out of the employer. For example, a
personal-autonomy presumption could require employers to specifically explain
under what circumstances they will consider off-duty conduct to be relevant to the
workplace. Such a “stickier” default could force the employer to be clearer to the
employee about the employer’s expectations for personal behavior and the behavior
or conduct when not at work. There is no doubt that off-duty employees can
behave in ways that embarrass their employers or damage their employer’s
reputations.268 Setting expectations early on in the relationship can help both
employers and employees get more out of the relationship for the long term.
How would a personal-autonomy default work? The Restatement of
Employment Law sets forth one possible avenue. Section 7.08 of the Restatement
states that “[u]nless the employer and employee agree otherwise, an employer is
subject to liability for intruding upon an employee’s personal autonomy interests if
the employer discharges the employee because the employee exercises a personal
autonomy interest.”269 Personal autonomy interests are defined as beliefs, conduct,
or activities that take place outside of the employment relationship, including lawful
conduct, political or religious beliefs, and participation in lawful associations.270 The
employer does not face liability if the employee’s autonomy interests interfered with
the employer’s legitimate business interests, including its “orderly operations and

See id. at 97 (discussing the information-forcing properties of the penalty default).
See Matthew Bodie, The Internet Wants You to Lose Your Job, QUARTZ.COM, Feb. 3, 2016,
http://qz.com/608697/the-internet-wants-you-to-lose-your-job/ (discussing examples).
269 RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 7.08(b) (2015).
270 Id. § 7.08(a).
267
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reputation in the marketplace.”271 This approach to the personal-autonomy default
tailors the rule to provide an explicit exception to the exception. This tailoring is
likely what most employment relationships would settle on, as no employer wants to
suffer serious reputational consequences from having an employee with off-duty
misconduct.272
The need to provide for employer protection is thus best accomplished
through a modification to the at-will default rule. Some employers may have
reputations or businesses that are more sensitive to harm from employee off-duty
conduct, or may care more about such conduct. The Republican Party may care if
one of its employees is a Bernie Sander supporter; a religious university may care if
one of its employees no longer shares its religious faith; an anti-alcohol educational
group may care if its employee is captured on video while intoxicated.273 It makes
sense to, at the very least, begin with the personal-autonomy presumption and see
how employers adapt to the new default before moving to a mandatory and
comprehensive approach.
CONCLUSION
This Article advocates for a change to the employment at-will default to
make clear that the employer will not terminate employees for exercising their
personal autonomy, as long as that exercise does not interfere with the employer’s
business or reputation. But is the very notion of employee personal autonomy a
doomed project—an ever-shrinking zone of personal space? The threats are
manifold. Employees are conducting more and more of their personal life while at
work and on employer-provided equipment, and more and more of their
employment duties at home.274 The field of people analytics, which applies big data
to human resources and personnel matters, looks to capture insights about
employees from a dizzying array of data sources—the more unconventional, the
better.275 As the reach of the analytics technology expands, employers may look to
Id. § 7.08(c).
For examples, see Wiegand v. Motiva Enterprises, LLC, 295 F. Supp. 2d 465 (D.N.J. 2003)
(employee selling white supremacy paraphernalia); Graebel v. American Dynatec Corp., 230 Wis. 2d
748, 604 N.W.2d 35 (Table) (Ct. App. 1999) (employee fired because of letter to local newspaper
using racially inflammatory expressions).
273 See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2771 (2014) (discussing corporations with
different missions and orientations).
274 Nick Bilton, The Temptation of Co-Working Spaces, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2016,
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/04/fashion/co-working-spaces-neuehouse-rvcc-wework.html
(“Technology has upended where we work. The line between work and play has been blurred, and the
difference between the office and home has all but disappeared.”).
275 For a discussion of people analytics, see Matthew T. Bodie, Miriam A. Cherry, Marcia L.
McCormick & Jintong Tang, The Law & Policy of People Analytics, Working Paper (on file with
author).
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what the employee had for breakfast, what she reads in her spare time, how much
sleep she gets, and how much caffeine she drinks in calculating and managing the
sources of employee productivity. Employees’ personal reputations are now more
easily connected to their employers, such that a drunken Friday night tirade or an
offensive tweet can bring down the weight of thousands or even millions of social
media participants onto the person and their employer.276 And in the platform
economy, the employee/independent service-provider is a locus of reputation to an
even greater extent.277 All of these are sources of pressure on the divide between our
employment relationship and our personal lives.
It may be that the separation of “work” and “home” was only a temporary
and perhaps illusory manifestation of historical patterns in business and culture. And
if employees do become more of their own individual “brand,” they may not mind
the diminishment of autonomy if they have more power and control over their work
lives. But the opposite is also possible: employees may be drawn ever further into
the employer, such that they have to conform even their personal lives and identities
to the employer’s brand.278 Their entire existence could be oriented around
maximizing their performance for their employer.279
The ferment around employee personal autonomy is demonstrated by the
many legal doctrines which deal with the subject.280 Changing the at-will default to
accommodate personal autonomy is a small step, but an important one. The
personal-autonomy presumption recognizes the common law’s role in managing the
employment relationship and in tailoring the at-will default to recognize the parties’
reasonable expectations. And it promotes the exchange of information over the
employer’s approach to off-duty conduct, associations, and beliefs. Although the
future of employee autonomy is uncertain, the law needs to change so that the at-will
rule does not hasten autonomy’s demise—unnecessarily and inappropriately.

See Bodie, supra note MTB-QZ (discussing the Ramkissoon and Sacco cases).
See Orly Lobel, The Law of the Platform, MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) (discussing the
importance of reputation).
278 Crain, supra note MC-2010, at 1183 (“In a service business, the front-line employee literally
embodies the brand.”).
279 Sports stars arguably live within this existence. See, e.g., Greg Bishop, Given the Way He Prepares, Tom
Brady Will Not Be Slowing Down Anytime Soon, SPORTSILLUSTRATED.COM, Dec. 11, 2014,
http://www.si.com/nfl/2014/12/10/tom-brady-new-england-patriots-age-fitness.
280 See Part II.B supra.
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